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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
(KEEP YOUR) SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Steve Sanders*
Same-sex marriage is now legal in six states, and tens of thousands of
same-sex couples have already gotten married. Yet the vast majority of
other states have adopted statutes or constitutional amendments banning
same-sex marriage. These mini-defense of marriage acts not only forbid
the creation of same-sex marriages; they also purport to void or deny
recognition to the perfectly valid same-sex marriages of couples who mi-
grate from states where such marriages are legal. These nonrecognition
laws effectively transform the marital parties into legal strangers, causing
significant harms: property rights are potentially altered, spouses disinher-
ited, children put at risk, and financial, medical, and personal plans and
decisions thrown into turmoil.
In this Article, I argue that an individual who marries in her state of domi-
cile and then migrates to a mini-defense of marriage act state has a
significant liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in the ongoing existence of her marriage. This liberty interest cre-
ates a right of marriage recognition that prevents another state from
effectively divorcing her against her will by operation of law. The right of
marriage recognition is conceptually and doctrinally distinguishable from
the constitutional "right to marry." It is a neutral principle grounded in
core Due Process Clause values: protection of reasonable expectations
and of marital and family privacy, respect for established legal and social
practices, and rejection of the idea that a state can sever a legal family re-
lationship merely by operation of law. A mini-defense of marriage act state
will, of course, have interests to be considered in refusing to recognize cer-
tain marriages. But under the intermediate form of scrutiny that is
appropriate in these circumstances, those interests do not rise to a suffi-
ciently important level to justify the nullification of migratory same-sex
marriages.
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. J.D., University
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Article benefitted from the comments and encouragement of David Halberstam, Don Herzog,
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1421
Michigan Law Review
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1422
I. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW: FROM LOCALISM
TO L IBERTY ............................................................................ 1427
A. Constitutional Protection for Marriage, Family,
and Intimate Relationships .............................................. 1428
B. State Regulation of Marriage .......................................... 1431
II. MARRIAGE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS ...................................... 1432
A. The Place of Celebration Rule ........................................ 1433
B. The Public Policy Exception ............................................ 1435
C. Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriages .......................... 1439
D. Same-Sex Marriage and the Limits of
Confl icts D octrine ........................................................... 1441
E. Conflict of Laws, State Interests, and
Individual Rights ............................................................. 1443
III. DISTINGUISHING MARRIAGE CREATION FROM
MARRIAGE RECOGNITION ....................................................... 1445
A. Affirmation Versus Interference ....................................... 1446
B. Forcing the State to Justify Its Harm ............................... 1450
IV. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION UNDER THE DUE
PROCESS C LAUSE .................................................................... 1452
A. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny ................................... 1452
B. Due Process Principles Supporting a Right
of Marriage Recognition ................................................. 1456
1. Reasonable Expectations and Reliance ..................... 1456
2. Marital and Family Privacy ....................................... 1459
3. Respect for Settled Legal and Social Practices ......... 1464
4. Due Process in Its Most Basic Sense ........................ 1466
C. Assessing Countervailing State Interests ......................... 1469
1. Traditional State Sovereignty over Family Law ....... 1469
2. Expressive and Channeling Interests ........................ 1471
3. State Control Over Marital Incidents ........................ 1473
4. Encouraging Heterosexual Procreation ..................... 1475
5. Fairness to Long-Term Residents ............................. 1477
V. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION AND FEDERALISM .......................... 1478
C ON CLUSION ....................................................................................... 1481
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Helen and Jenny reside and marry in Iowa. Iowa is among
the six states, plus the District of Columbia, where same-sex marriage is
now legal.1 Now consider that more than 130,000 same-sex couples in the
1. The states are Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and
Vermont. Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT'L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-
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United States report being married,2 and that between 2 and 3 percent of
Americans move to a different state each year3-meaning we could expect
that at least 2,600 married same-sex couples may do so. And so imagine that
Helen and Jenny pull up stakes and move to Indiana. Perhaps Helen's em-
ployer transfers her to Indianapolis or Jenny's elderly mom in Fort Wayne
needs her closer by.
Helen and Jenny now have a problem. Indiana law purports to declare
their marriage "void" because it involves two members of the same sex.4
Indiana is among forty-one states that have adopted statutes or constitutional
amendments banning same-sex marriage (typically called mini-defense of
marriage acts, or "mini-DOMAs").5 The vast majority of mini-DOMAs not
only forbid the creation of same-sex marriages but their statutory or consti-
tutional language would also void or deny recognition to the perfectly valid
same-sex marriages of couples who migrate from states where such mar-
riages are legal.6 Even if they do not purport to actually void a marriage,
these nonrecognition laws transform same-sex marital parties into complete
legal strangers, with none of the customary rights or incidents of marriage,
so long as they continue to live in the mini-DOMA state. For practical pur-
poses, the parties have been divorced against their will by operation of law.
We live in a highly mobile country, and so we can assume that many
married same-sex couples have already changed states, or will do so, for jobs,
education, family, and personal reasons. The question of "what happens to
marriage-overview.aspx (last updated Feb. 13, 2012) [hereinafter NAT'L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES]. As this Article was going to press, legislation had been approved in Mary-
land and the State of Washington to allow same-sex marriages, but the laws had not yet taken
effect and opponents were preparing to attempt to repeal the laws by ballot initiative. David
Crary, Bruising Gay-Marriage Showdowns Likely in 5 States, AssocIATED PRESS, Mar. 8,
2012, available at 2012 WLNR 5114280.
2. Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex Married Couples, U.S. CENSUS
2010 (Sept. 27, 2011), http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cbl 1-cn 181 .html.
3. See Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, Millions More Americans Move to New
States, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-11-29-
Mobility_N.htm (citing U.S. census data from 2003, 2005, and 2006).
4. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 2008) (declaring same-sex marriages "void ...
even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized").
5. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note I (listing, in a table, the
states that either define marriage by statute as between a man and a woman or have passed a
DOMA constitutional amendment). The states that neither license nor prohibit same-sex mar-
riage are New Jersey, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. Id.
6. For example, Arkansas law provides that "[a]ll marriages contracted outside this
state that would be valid by the laws of the state or country in which the marriages were con-
summated and in which the parties then actually resided shall be valid in all the courts in this
state," but that "[tihis section shall not apply to a marriage between persons of the same sex."
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107(a)-(b) (2009). Missouri law states flatly that "[any purported
marriage not between a man and a woman is invalid" and that "[a] marriage between persons
of the same sex will not be recognized for any purpose in this state even when valid where
contracted.' Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022(2), (4) (West 2003). And Ohio's mini-DOMA pro-
vides, "Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in any other jurisdiction shall be
considered and treated in all respects as having no legal force or effect in this state and shall
not be recognized by this state." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(2) (West 2008).
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people in legally recognized same-sex relationships when they cross state
lines" has received "far too little attention in the debates about gay rights. '7
Nonrecognition laws are already disrupting lives, and it is reasonable to ex-
pect that they will become an increasingly serious issue in gay rights
litigation, politics, and even the national employment marketplace. 8 (For
example, major corporations are increasingly adopting gay-friendly poli-
cies,9 but a married gay or lesbian worker might well balk at accepting a
transfer to a state that purports to nullify her marriage.)' 0
Most legal scholars who think about this question would say that Helen
and Jenny have a conflict of laws problem: they are collateral damage in a
scheme of family law localism that says every state gets to control the defi-
nition of marriage within its borders. I maintain, by contrast, that couples
like Helen and Jenny actually have a constitutional problem, one that re-
quires a constitutional solution. And to be clear, the problem is not about
their "right to marry"-after all, they already are married. Rather, the prob-
lem is about their right to remain married.
In this Article, I argue that an individual who legally marries in her state
of domicile,II and then migrates to another state that becomes her new dom-
icile, has a significant liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause in the ongoing existence of her marriage. This liberty
interest creates a right of marriage recognition that prevents a mini-DOMA
state from effectively divorcing her by operation of law. This right of mar-
riage recognition is conceptually and doctrinally distinguishable from the
constitutional "right to marry."' 2 It is a neutral principle, grounded in core
Due Process Clause values: protection of reasonable expectations and of
marital and family privacy, respect for established legal and social practices,
and rejection of the idea that a state can sever a legal family relationship or
alter a legal status merely by operation of law.13 Of course, this is not to de-
ny that a mini-DOMA jurisdiction will believe that it possesses state inter-
7. Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of Strategic Litigation, 17 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 2
(2008).
8. The mainstream media have begun to notice the problem. See, e.g., John Schwartz,
When Same-Sex Marriages End, N.Y. TimEs, July 2, 2011, available at http:I/
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/sunday-review/O3divorce.html.
9. See Corporate Equality Index 2012, Hum. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://
www.hrc.org/resources/entry/corporate-equality-index-2011 (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
10. As one way of facilitating mobility and freedom of choice for married couples,
Adam Candeub and Mae Kuykendall have suggested that states should no longer require the
parties' physical presence in the state before they will authorize a marriage, thereby "mak[ing]
their marriage formation laws accessible to those beyond their physical boundaries." Adam
Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 735, 741
(2011).
11. "Domicile" is effectively the legal "headquarters" of a person's life, used for deter-
mining which state's laws apply to her activities. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF
LAWS 249 (4th ed. 2004).
12. See infra Section IMl.A.
13. See infra Section IV.B.
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interests that justify refusing to recognize certain marriages. 14 But under the
intermediate form of scrutiny, which I argue is appropriate,1 5 those interests
are not sufficiently important to justify nullification of a migratory same-sex
marriage.
Law favors stability in legal relationships, vindication of justified expec-
tations, and preventing casual evasion of legal duties and responsibilities.
For these reasons, every state adheres to a general rule that a marriage that
was valid under the law of the place where it was celebrated should be rec-
ognized everywhere.' 6 Current nonrecognition laws-most of them enacted
in the last fifteen years as part of the political backlash against same-sex
marriage-are a stark and arguably unprecedented departure from this rule.
As a result, migratory same-sex couples face the prospect of wrenching dis-
ruption in their lives, loss of parental and property rights, and an array of
other problems and indignities, large and small, that a rational legal regime
should not tolerate. Justice O'Connor once observed that "[ilt is difficult to
imagine a right more essential to the Nation as a whole than the right to es-
tablish residence in a new State."' 7 And the Supreme Court almost seventy
years ago described the idea that a person could simultaneously be married
in one state and unmarried in another as "the most perplexing and distress-
ing complication[] in the domestic relations of... citizens." 8 Yet that is the
situation many married same-sex couples face today.
Conflict of laws is the traditional legal home for interstate marriage
recognition, and on a fair reading, mainstream conflicts doctrine frowns on
the state of affairs that mini-DOMAs have created, because conflicts doc-
trine favors validating marriages by looking to the law of the place of
celebration. But conflicts doctrine is powerless to do anything about the
problem, because it lacks any external enforcement mechanisms. By con-
trast, the Constitution provides checks and limitations on state practices that
invade personal rights. Thus, for a fairer and more rational solution to the
marriage recognition problem, we should look to the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court declared marriage a fundamental right more than
forty years ago.1 9 The argument that the right to marry includes same-sex
couples has been advanced in recent state and federal litigation, but the
question is one that even many thoughtful supporters argue the Court
should not and will not settle in the very near future.20 A separate right of
14. See infra Section IV.C.
15. See infra Section IV.A.
16. See infra Section H.A.
17. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 76-77 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
18. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 (1942) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
19. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
20. See, e.g., William Eskridge, Marriage Equality State by State, SCOTUSBLoG (Aug.
15, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/marriage-equality-state-by-state/
(arguing that same-sex marriage is "an issue that now divides the country both intensely and
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marriage recognition, if advanced in federal litigation, would alleviate an
urgent problem while allowing the political and legal debates over same-sex
marriage to continue. It would recognize, in a spirit of laboratories-of-
democracy-style federalism, that states "should intensely compete to show
that [one view of marriage] is more reasonable than the other,"21 while sim-
ultaneously recognizing that states should not be allowed to "inflict serious
harm" on couples who are already married "in order to make a purely sym-
bolic point."22 Alternatively, if the Justices are inclined to decide the
question of same-sex marriage sooner rather than later, the principles I dis-
cuss in this Article should inform the Court's consideration, since, in
deciding whether same-sex couples have a right to marry, the Court would
also be affecting the lives of tens of thousands of couples who are already
married.23
The right of marriage recognition would be a modest, carefully tailored
solution to a pressing problem of interstate relations and human dignity. It
would not force any state to create a marriage of which it disapproves, or
allow any couple to evade their own state's marriage laws. It would simply
prohibit states from depriving persons of their existing marriages by carving
out a discriminatory exception to the well-established rule of marriage recog-
nition. The right would put teeth into the eminently sound and longstanding
rule of interstate marriage recognition-a rule that protects individual married
persons (along with their children, property, and creditors) as well as the
needs of a national marketplace and the rational functioning of a highly
mobile society. It would also vindicate the principle, well established in
constitutional law, that extant legal statuses and family relationships should
not be lightly disrupted by the coercive power of the state.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I explain how marriage and
family life today are no longer understood through a prism of localism and
strict state control. Rather, they are understood, both in law and by society
generally, as matters of private ordering, autonomy, and individual rights. In
that context, laws that would allow a state to unilaterally void or deny
recognition to an extant marriage stand out as highly anomalous.
In Part II, I describe the existing approach to marriage recognition under
conflict of laws doctrine. The problem, I explain, is not that modem con-
flicts doctrine does not prescribe the right rule for recognizing migratory
marriages-it does. The problem, rather, is that most states are refusing to
follow this rule, and conflicts doctrine has no enforcement mechanisms to
back up its policies. Consequently, we cannot deal rationally or fairly with
migratory same-sex marriages unless we move beyond the paradigm of con-
evenly-and is therefore an issue that ought not be resolved one way or the other until public
preferences become more settled").
21. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MAR-
RIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 153 (2006).
22. Id. at 150.
23. I develop this point further in Steve Sanders, The Right to Marry, and the Right to
Remain Married, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 12:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
2011/08/the-right-to-marry-and-the-right-to-remain-marriedL.
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flicts doctrine and accept marriage recognition as an issue of constitutional
significance.
In Part III, I consider how marriage creation differs from marriage
recognition and how refusing to license a marriage differs from nullifying
one. These differences illuminate the harms that nonrecognition laws inflict
on individual interests-harms a state should be required to justify.
In Part IV, I discuss four principles of constitutional due process that sup-
port a right of marriage recognition: protection of reasonable expectations,
marital and family privacy, respect for settled legal and social practices, and
the expectation of proper procedure before a state deprives an individual of
liberty. I then explain why, under the intermediate level of scrutiny that is ap-
propriate for a right of marriage recognition, we must evaluate a state's
interests in its same-sex marriage policy, not in the abstract, but rather in the
specific context of what effect that policy has on extant marriages. Examin-
ing these interests, I conclude that they either are not important enough to
justify marriage nullification, or that the radical step of marriage nullifica-
tion is not necessary to significantly further them.
Finally, in Part V, I discuss why a right of marriage recognition strikes
an appropriate balance for purposes of federalism. It would allow each state
to decide whether to provide same-sex marriage for its own domiciliaries,
while underscoring the principle that recognizing a sister state's valid mar-
riage is the price of membership in a federal system of equal state
sovereigns.
I. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW: FROM LOCALISM TO LIBERTY
It was once accurate for the Supreme Court to declare, as it did in the
late nineteenth century, that "It]he State ... has absolute right to prescribe
the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created,"'24 and that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not
to the laws of the United States."2 5 But today marriage and family life are
not understood, either in law or everyday life, through a prism of localism
and strict state control. Rather, they are predominantly understood as mat-
ters that are based on values of private ordering, autonomy, and individual
rights.
To lay the groundwork for my arguments about the impotence of con-
flicts doctrine and the need for a due process right of marriage recognition,
it is helpful to briefly review the protections that marriage, family, and inti-
mate relationships already receive under the Constitution as matters of
individual liberty, as well as the realities of contemporary state marriage
regulation. Although laws that purport to void or deny recognition to disap-
proved marriages might seem natural and defensible to citizens accustomed
24, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878).
25. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
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to the heavy hand of the State intervening in their marital and family lives,
such a system would be unrecognizable to most Americans today.
A. Constitutional Protection for Marriage, Family,
and Intimate Relationships
The protections of the Due Process Clause for family privacy and auton-
omy have their origins in the Lochner-era cases Meyer v. Nebraska26 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 both of which underscored the right of parents
to control the education of their children. The Court spoke broadly of the
"liberty guaranteed ... by the Fourteenth Amendment," which included the
rights "to marry" and "establish a home and bring up children. '28 In 1944,
the Court said that its due process jurisprudence created a "private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter."29
The Court declared marriage a fundamental right in 1967 in Loving v.
Virginia," for the first time striking down state laws that barred entry to
marriage based on a particular characteristic (in that case, race). Loving was
"widely understood as calling into question much state regulation of mar-
riage."'" After Loving, "[n]o longer [could] it be assumed that states ha[d]
autonomy over rules and law governing marital status. '32 The Court struck
down other state-law marriage restrictions in Zablocki v. Redhai13 (1978)
and Turner v. Safley 34 (1987).
Two years before granting constitutional protection to the right to get mar-
ried, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut35 laid the foundation for the modem
right of privacy by protecting an existing marital relationship--something the
Court said was "intimate to the degree of being sacred" 36 -against the state's
coercive moral regulation. Connecticut's ban on birth control for married cou-
ples could not stand, the Court said, "in light of the familiar principle, so often
applied by this Court, that a 'governmental purpose to control or prevent ac-
tivities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
26. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
28. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
29. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
30. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
31. Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62
VA. L. REv. 663, 668 (1976).
32. Henry H. Foster, Jr., Marriage: A "Basic Civil Right of Man," 37 FORDHiAM L. REv.
51,51 (1968).
33. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down Wisconsin statute that prohibited deadbeat
fathers from getting married without court approval).
34. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking down regulation which prohibited prisoners from mar-
rying other inmates or civilians).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
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means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.' ",37
Together, Griswold and Loving signaled that "traditional state control of
the marital status ha[d] to give way to current notions of individual liberty
and the right of privacy."3 8 With these decisions, as well as the changes in
society that they acknowledged, 9 "the law ... retreated from a confidently
moral view of marriage" to an understanding of marriage as "a private rela-
tionship which the law has no right to regulate and whose consequences
affect only the parties to the marriage, not the general public."4 "Where
mid-nineteenth-century judges and other public spokesmen had hardly been
able to speak of marriage without mentioning Christian morality, mid-
twentieth-century discourse saw the hallmarks of the institution in liberty
and privacy, consent and freedom."41
Arguably, the Court's application of the Constitution to curb states' use
of marital law to enact moral codes actually began in 1942 with Williams v.
North Carolina, which held that once a divorce is effective in one state, it
must be given full faith and credit in every other state. 42 As Ann Estin ar-
gues, Williams began a series of divorce-related decisions in which the
Court "severed the connection between state power and marital status,
changing the shape of both divorce law and American federalism. '43 By giv-
ing individuals the power to choose which jurisdiction would control their
marital status, "the divorce cases fundamentally altered state power to set
the normative boundaries of family life" 44 and "moved individual interests
to the center of marital status determinations. 45
Besides constitutionalizing marriage and divorce, the Court gave protec-
tion under the Due Process Clause to matters of family privacy and autonomy,
and also extended liberty and privacy guarantees to non-marital relationships.
Eisenstadt v. Baird46 extended the right of access to birth control to unmarried
persons, explaining that "the marital couple is not an independent entity ...
but an association of two individuals," and that the right of privacy protected
"the individual" against "unwarranted governmental intrusion" into personal
37. Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
38. Foster, supra note 32, at 51.
39. Marriage historian Nancy Cott argues that far from imposing its own values, the
Court was "just keeping pace with the upheavals in society." NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 199 (2000).
40. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law
from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REv. 243, 243-44 (2003).
41. COTT, supra note 39, at 197.
42. 317 U.S. 287, 296-97 (1942).
43. Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 381,382 (2007).
44. Id. at 383.
45. Id. at 396.
46. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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relationships.47 Stanley v. Illinois held that a state could not automatically pre-
sume that an unwed father was an unfit parent, emphasizing that "familial
bonds" in unmarried households are "often as warm, enduring, and im-
portant as those" in married households.4 8 Roe v. Wade protected the right to
abortion.49 And in 1977, Justice Powell, writing for the plurality in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland,50 a case about the right of family members to live
together, synthesized a principle from the Court's due process cases that
dated back to Meyer51 : when government "undertakes ... intrusive regula-
tion of the family ... the usual judicial deference to the legislature is
inappropriate. 52 Accordingly, "when the government intrudes on choices
concerning family living arrangements, th[e] Court must examine carefully
the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to
which they are served by the challenged regulation."53
Again reviewing its Due Process Clause jurisprudence in 1992, the
Court said that the Constitution "affords ... protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education" because these things "involv[e] the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy."54 The Constitution thereby circumscribes
the power of states to dictate the terms of marriage and family life based on
the preferences or moral views of a governing majority: "Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed un-
der compulsion of the State. 55
In 2003, the Court brought gay and lesbian relationships under the pro-
tection of the Due Process Clause in Lawrence v. Texas,56 striking down
sodomy laws in language that emphasized individual liberty and admonish-
ing "attempts by the State ... to define the meaning of [a] relationship or to
set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects.5
7
Thus, the Court's modern due process jurisprudence does not treat mar-
riage, family, and intimate relationships as discrete subjects. Rather, it
protects, at a higher level of abstraction, the privacy and "personal choices"
that are inherent in all of these matters, and it requires justification when
47. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
48. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
51. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
52. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
53. Id.
54. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
55. Id.
56. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
1430 [Vol. 110:1421
Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage
government interferes with them. This understanding of due process doc-
trine informs the arguments I offer later in this Article.5 8
B. State Regulation of Marriage
During the same time that the Supreme Court was underscoring the in-
dividual liberties inherent in marriage, family life, and intimate
relationships, states were "in the process of divesting [themselves] of [the]
marriage regulation business," and "a major alteration in the posture of the
State with respect to the family [was beginning] to emerge."59 The protec-
tion of autonomy for families and individuals was becoming one of the core
themes of modem family law. 60
Traditionally, state regulation of existing marriages was "justified in or-
der to protect and preserve [the] essential role of the family by ensuring a
strong family system," including "securing the continued welfare of.. . citi-
zens by making them legally responsible for one another" and "ensuring that
children are properly cared for."61 While marriage continues to serve those
functions today, existing marriages are not pervasively regulated by the
state-indeed, they are hardly regulated at all. Instead, marriage law in the
United States today reflects values of autonomy rather than conformity:
lawmakers "treat marriage as a private and all-but-inscrutable relation-
ship,' 6 and thus there is "little intervention in the daily workings of an
intact marriage. '63 Actual intervention is limited mostly to instances of
"abuse or neglect, and in the decisions regarding property, child support and
child custody upon a petition for dissolution."' Most of the "regulation" of
marriage actually involves the provision of various state-created rights, priv-
ileges, and other marital incidents. 65 Extant marriages are not subject to the
state's surveillance, approval, or revalidation.
The emergence of same-sex marriage into the mainstream of American
society and law has sparked a backlash of what we might call marriage neo-
classicism. Natural law theorists as well as conservative lawmakers and
commentators have attempted to revive notions of marriage as something
"ordained by God" and founded on traditional gender roles and heterosexual
58. See infra Part IV.
59. Glendon, supra note 31, at 666.
60. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW
180-184 (3d ed. 2007).
61. Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1169, 1242-45 (1974).
62. Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, I I VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
307, 323 (2004).
63. Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 FAM. L.Q. 255, 267
(2002).
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 337-346 and accompanying text.
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procreation. 66 The clear implication of this neoclassicism is that voiding or
denying recognition to disfavored marriages is a reasonable exercise of a
state's traditional police powers to regulate marriage and family law. But the
neoclassical view of the relationship between marriage and the state is not
an accurate description of current legal and social reality, and so it does not
provide an adequate justification for nonrecognition laws.
In summary, marriage and family are not understood today as merely
"state legislatures'. . . political creation."67 "Despite the survival of old rhet-
oric assigning the family to local authority, the constitutional model that
consigned the family to local control was effectively discarded" with the
divorce cases starting in the 1940s,6" and marriage, family, and intimate rela-
tionships are now encompassed within constitutional liberty and privacy
guarantees. Further, the most important purposes of modem state marriage
regulation and of family law generally are not to enforce conformity to
state-mandated norms, but to protect the integrity of extant marriages, the
dignity and privacy of spouses, and the autonomy and private ordering of
families. None of this is to say that the Court's marriage and family privacy
jurisprudence is easily applied to novel situations.69 But it does mean, at the
very least, that a state's disruption of intact marital and family relation-
ships-and that is what mini-DOMAs do, I believe, when they purport to
convert married persons to the status of legal strangers-should be regarded
as an extraordinary intervention.
II. MARRIAGE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Conflict of laws is the traditional doctrinal home for questions of in-
terstate marriage recognition. To understand why marriage recognition is a
proper subject for constitutional law, it is first necessary to understand
why the conflict of laws approach is broken. Modem conflicts doctrine
provides a sound rule: a state should recognize a migratory marriage that
was procured in good faith, even if that state itself would not have licensed
66. See, e.g., Monte Neil Stewart, Marriage Facts, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 313,
316, 321-22 (2008) (describing "man-woman marriage" as "ancient" and arguing that it
"uniquely" produces various "social goods" such as "bridging the male-female divide" and
giving "[s]ocial and official endorsement" to "heterosexual intercourse[, which] society may
rationally value above all other such forms"). By contrast, other scholars have warned about
"[t]he hazards of importing" male-dominated, nineteenth-century conceptions about marriage
"to our twenty-first century moment." Mae Kuykendall & Adam Candeub, Symposium Over-
view: Perspectives on Innovative Marriage Procedure, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 11-12
(2011).
67. See CoTT, supra note 39, at 54 (describing nineteenth-century conceptions of mar-
riage).
68. Estin, supra note 43, at 383.
69. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 531-
32 (2000) ("More than seventy-five years after the Supreme Court first began to carve out 'a
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,' the boundaries of that constitutional
sanctuary remain decidedly unclear." (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977)).
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the marriage. But conflicts doctrine is, in the end, nothing more than a set
of rules developed by scholars and judges, with no enforcement mecha-
nisms. Conflicts rules, no matter how reasonable and necessary to promote
comity and fairness, can always be overridden by legislation or state con-
stitutional amendment-which is what has happened in the last two
decades with the emergence of mini-DOMAs. State court judges are reluc-
tant to overturn or give narrowing interpretations to such measures-and
where mini-DOMAs are embedded in state constitutions, as most now are,
judges are effectively disabled from doing so. In this Part, I describe the
prevailing rule for recognizing marriages, how same-sex marriages have
been excluded from that rule, and why we should not rely on conflicts
doctrine to solve the pressing social and legal problem of same-sex mar-
riage nullification.
A. The Place of Celebration Rule
It is a longstanding matter of legal and social practice that "[o]rdinarily,
marriages that are valid where they are celebrated are valid everywhere, for
all purposes."70 Common law commentators, modern conflicts authorities,
and courts at all levels have agreed that it is in everyone's interests-married
individuals, society, and the interstate system-for states to recognize each
other's marriages. This principle is embodied in the so-called "place of cel-
ebration rule," which holds that the validity of a marriage should be
governed by the law of the jurisdiction where it was created-usually the
marital parties' domicile. As one federal court put it succinctly, the "policy
of the civilized world[] is to sustain marriages, not to upset them."7 1
Recognizing that every state is entitled to govern its own domiciliaries,
the place of celebration rule traditionally did not apply to so-called evasive
marriages, those where the couple left their domicile briefly to procure a
marriage that their home state would not have licensed.72 Accordingly, my
argument in this Article concerns only nonevasive marriages, i.e., where the
couple marries in their state of domicile or in a state whose marriage law is
consistent with that of their domicile. Conceptually, evasive marriages are
essentially about the right to marry in the first instance. When an Indiana
couple flies to Boston for the weekend to get married, they are in some
sense engaging in an act of civil disobedience; they are making a statement
about the oppressiveness of their own state's marriage law. But because they
live under the laws of Indiana, they have no reasonable expectation from
70. Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76
TEx. L. REV. 921, 922 (1998).
71. Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329, 332 (E.D. Tenn. 1949).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) ("A marriage
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will every-
where be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which
had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the mar-
riage."). This is not to say that some states did not still go ahead and recognize evasive
marriages under the place of celebration rule, but just that they were less likely to do so.
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the outset that Indiana will honor their marriage. By contrast, if the same
couple lives and marries in Massachusetts and then later moves to Indiana,
they have already become vested in their marriage and have acquired a
reasonable expectation that their marriage should continue indefinitely. 73 (I
explain further in Part III how marriage creation differs from marriage
nullification.) And so the constitutional rule I propose would preserve the
traditional power of states to control the criteria for marriage entry for their
own domiciliaries. But it would prescribe that once a marriage is created, it
gives rise to important reliance and privacy interests that must be weighed
against the state's own interests in its marriage policy.74
The place of celebration rule is a voluntary rule of comity, not a matter
of constitutional full faith and credit,75 but it is recognized in every state,7 6
and thus it has become a defining feature and basic incident of American
marriage. It enacts the commonsense principle that "[b]ecause marriage is a
continuing relationship, there is normally a need that its existence be subject
to regulation by one law without occasion for repeated redetermination of
the validity."77 It recognizes that individuals order their lives based on their
marital status and "need to know reliably and certainly, and at once, whether
they are married or not. It would be messy to have a couple married in one
state and not in another."78 As one state high court has put it, "uniformity in
the recognition of the marital status" is important "so that persons legally
married according to the laws of one State will not be held to be living in
adultery in another State, and that children begotten in lawful wedlock in
one State will not be held illegitimate in another."79 Uniform marriage
recognition "confirms the parties' expectations, it provides stability in an
area where stability (because of children and property) is very important,
and it avoids the potentially hideous problems that would arise if the legality
of a marriage varied from state to state. '80 Such problems include the possi-
bility that an individual "who undertake[s] the obligations of marriage in" a
state with favorable law might later "escape those obligations simply by relo-
cating to another state" that regards the marriage as without legal effect. 81
73. See infra Section IV.B.1.
74. See infra Section IV.C.
75. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 353-58 (2005).
76. Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform
Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REv. 433, 461 (2005) (stating that, historically, "[a]ll jurisdictions
followed some version of lex loci contractus in evaluating the validity of a marriage").
77. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 11, at 560.
78. LUTHER L. McDOUGAL Il ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 713 (5th ed. 2001).
79. Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 408 (Md. 1952).
80. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS 398 (3d ed. 2002).
81. Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion
of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 1, 6 (2009).
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Such a person could flee with marital property, marry someone else, and end
up a bigamist, at least in the eyes of the original marital domicile.82
The place of celebration rule was well established at common law. A
New York court in 1854 said it went beyond interstate comity and was a
"universal practice of civilized nations. 83 Writing more than a century ago,
Joel Prentiss Bishop characterized marriage as a form of vested right that
went with the couple wherever they traveled:
[T]here is in the nature of things no way in which marriage can be an in-
ternational institution, so that whatever parties are held to be married in
one country will be held the same in every other, except by referring the
question to the law of the place in which the celebration transpired. This
view does not involve.. . a submission by one country to the laws of other
countries; it is simply that, when parties enter it from abroad, they may
bring with them whatever they had acquired abroad,-the foreign law
being looked into only to ascertain whether or not the thing claimed con-
stitutes such acquisition.'
Bishop explained that certainty in marriage was a matter of the highest order
for both the parties and the broader society. The result of the place of cele-
bration rule
is that, for the peace of the world, for the prosperity of its respective
communities, for the well-being of families, for virtue in social life, for
good morals, for religion, for everything held dear by the race of man in
common, it is necessary there should be one universal rule whereby to
determine whether parties are to be regarded as married or not[.] 5
Without such a rule, Bishop said, "no end can be predicted to the confusion
which will ensue.' 8
6
B. The Public Policy Exception
Although it is supported by sensible policies and humane values, the
place of celebration rule is only a principle of voluntary comity with no ex-
ternal enforcement mechanism. Under an escape device known as the
"public policy exception," a state can, in practice, refuse to recognize any
marriage it finds distasteful, based on nothing more than the ability of a
governing majority to enact a nonrecognition statute or constitutional
amendment.
At common law, the public policy exception was primarily intended to
bar recognition of polygamous or incestuous unions8 7-"marriages which
82. See id. at 13-18.
83. Cropsey v. Ogden, 11 N.Y. 228, 236 (1854).
84. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEP-
ARATION § 851 (1891).
85. Id. § 856.
86. Id.
87. Grossman, supra note 76, at 435.
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by the common voice of civilized nations [were regarded as] vicious past
toleration."88 It was not intended to bar marriages that were merely "contra-
ry to the general law of the State in which the question arises."89 The other
major purpose of the public policy exception was to bar recognition of eva-
sive marriages.90
As an escape device to avoid a general conflicts rule, the public policy
exception is not unique to marriage, and it was traditionally understood as a
narrow, judge-made exception to the general expectation that a forum court
would enforce rights acquired under the laws of another state. Judge
Cardozo said that the exception should be permitted only if the foreign
right "in its nature offends [the forum state's] sense of justice or menaces
the public welfare," or if it "violate[s] some fundamental principle of jus-
tice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal."91 The simple fact that the forum's "own
scheme of legislation may be different" was not enough to trigger the ex-
ception.92 "If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact that we do not
give a like right is no reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in getting
what belongs to him. '93 As to marriage specifically, it was long similarly
understood that the public policy exception should be "sparingly ap-
plied,"94 and that a valid marriage should be denied recognition "only
where there is rather violent conflict between the enjoyment of an incident
[of marriage] and the assumed social order where enjoyment is sought."95
Prior to the advent of legal same-sex marriage less than ten years ago,
did states use the public policy exception in a principled and consistent way
to guard their own definitions of marriage? The evidence suggests that the
answer is no. Indeed, "until the recent hysteria associated with same sex
marriage, the public policy exception was fast becoming obsolete." 96 In a
1996 study, Barbara Cox and a team of researchers found that the public
policy exception, while frequently mentioned in court decisions, was rarely
actually applied to invalidate a marriage that did not involve evasion of the
domicile's marriage laws.97 Cox and her colleagues concluded:
[C]ourts do not use a public policy exception to refuse to validate an out-of-
state marriage even when the domicile has an explicit statutory prohibition
against the marriage in question. Instead, courts repeatedly indicate that they
have the discretion to use such a public policy exception but then validate the
88. BIsHoP, supra note 84, § 857.
89. Id. § 858.
90. Grossman, supra note 76, at 435.
91. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201-02 (N.Y. 1918).
92. Id. at 201.
93. Id.
94. Borchers, supra note 75, at 354.
95. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 11, at 561.
96. Singer, supra note 81, at 40.
97. See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-
of-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 61 (1996).
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out-of-state marriage following the general rule in favor of recognition.
Although a few states use the exception consistently, virtually all the rest
recognize the existence of such an exception but rarely use it.98
Before same-sex marriage, the strongest marriage taboo concerned inter-
racial marriages, or "miscegenation," which thirteen states still prohibited
prior to Loving. Andrew Koppelman observes that "lilt would... be hard to
argue that the southern states' public policy against miscegenation was less
strong than modern public policies against same-sex marriage." 99 Indeed,
interracial unions were often criminalized. Yet Koppelman found that,
even in this charged context, the southern states did not make a blunder-
buss of their own public policy. Their decisions concerning the validity of
interracial marriages were surprisingly fact-dependent. They did not utterly
disregard the interests of the parties to the forbidden marriages or of the
states that had recognized such marriages, but weighed these against the
countervailing interests of the forum."°
Where migratory marriages were concerned, Koppelman found that
southern legal authorities were, at worst, "divided." 10' Only two state stat-
utes and four reported cases addressed the issue."0 2 "One of the statutes
clearly permitted migratory marriages, and the other was ambiguous but
quite possibly did so.
What about polygamy and incest, the other two marriage categories
where the public policy exception historically was thought to be justified?
No American state has ever licensed polygamous marriages, and none will
do so anytime soon. While polyamory has become something of a pop cul-
ture phenomenon, 1°4 there is no social movement for polygamist marriage
equality and none is likely to appear anytime soon. To the extent that cases
involving recognition of polygamous marriages have arisen, they have most-
ly involved marriages performed on Native American reservations, the only
jurisdictions within the territorial United States where polygamous unions
have ever been legally valid. 05 Koppelman reports that "when such practices
98. Id. at 66-67; see also EH. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the
Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 561, 568 (2001) (observing that "courts frequently up-
hold marriages that are valid where made but barred by the internal domicile law").
99. KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 36.
100. Id.
101. Id. at44.
102. Id. at 43.
103. Id.
104. See Jessica Bennett, Only You. And You. And You: Polyamory-Relationships with
Multiple, Mutually Consenting Partners-Has a Coming-Out Party, NEWSWEEK, July 28,
2009, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/07/28/only-you-and-you-
and-you.htnil.
105. KoPPELMAN, supra note 21,-at 30.
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were questioned in litigation, the attitude of state courts was uniformly one
of 'casual tolerance.' "106
As for incest, no state has ever licensed parent-child or sibling marriages;
"incest" in American cases has "involved marriages between first cousins,
aunts and nephews, uncles and nieces, or even more remote relations."107
Here, too, the public policy exception has not had much bite: Koppelman
finds that "[a]lthough earlier cases tended to invalidate such marriages, later
ones have tended to uphold them."' 108 In In re May's Estate,"° New York rec-
ognized a Rhode Island marriage between an uncle and niece even though the
marriage violated New York's incest laws. 0 More recently, a Louisiana ap-
pellate court held that an Iranian marriage between first cousins was valid in
Louisiana and not a violation of the state's strong public policy.", (At the
same time, it should be noted, Louisiana has one of the nation's harshest
laws against recognition of same-sex relationships in any form.' 12)
To sum up, while states nominally retain the right to bar recognition of
strongly disapproved marriages, in practice the modem trend has been in favor
of validating marriages whenever possible. Under the rule of the Second Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws, "A marriage which satisfies the requirements of
the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as
valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had
the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time
of the marriage.""' 3 This policy underscores the place of celebration rule and
allows use of the public policy exception only for evasive marriages (at the
time of the marriage, it is the couple's domicile that has the "most signifi-
cant relationship"). Only with same-sex marriages have states imposed
emphatic and inflexible rules of nonrecognition.
106. Id. (quoting 2 ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & ERIK JAYME, PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 166 (1973) and collecting cases and other authorities). As one case cited by Koppelman
explained, "[A]mong these Indians polygamous marriages have always been recognized as
valid," and "[w]e cannot interfere with the validity of such marriages without subjecting them
to rules of law which never bound them." Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 605-06
(Mich. 1889).
107. KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 32.
108. Id. (citing LENNART P;,LSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS 75-
76(1981)).
109. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
110. In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 7.
111. Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731, 749-50 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
112. The Louisiana Constitution not only provides that marriage "shall consist only of
the union of one man and one woman," it also bars recognition of civil unions, domestic part-
nerships, and possibly private contractual arrangements between same-sex partners by
declaring that "[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmar-
ried individuals shall not be valid or recognized." LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (emphasis added).
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C. Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriages
Legally, politically, and culturally, same-sex marriage has gone main-
stream. Public opinion has shifted dramatically in recent years, and a
majority of Americans now say that they support equal marriage rights for
gays and lesbians.' 4 Two of the nation's most prominent lawyers-a liberal
Democrat and a conservative Republican-have teamed up to challenge
California's constitutional mini-DOMA." 5 The current presidential admin-
istration has taken the official stance that sexual orientation should get
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and that, under this
standard, the federal DOMA is unconstitutional.1 16 In addition to the six
states plus the District of Columbia where same-sex marriage is now legal,
an additional nine states provide state-level spousal rights in the form of
civil unions or registered domestic partnerships." 7 Yet despite all this main-
streaming, forty-one states maintain statutes or constitutional amendments
categorically barring same-sex marriage, the vast majority of which would
also void or deny recognition to existing marriages. 18 How did we get here?
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court became the first state high court to
conclude that the denial of same-sex marriage implicated guarantees in its
state constitution. 9 Hawaii voters then amended their constitution to em-
power legislators to prohibit same-sex marriage before the court had a
chance to finalize that decision. 120 But for a while, it looked as though gays
and lesbians might be able to marry in Hawaii and then return to the main-
land with the expectation that their marriages would be honored in their
domiciles.
This concern over a flood of evasive marriages generated the first wave of
mini-DOMAs. Congress also enacted the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA"), which barred federal recognition of same-sex marriages and de-
clared that no state was required "to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship be-
tween persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws
114. See Nate Silver, Gay Marriage Opponents Now in Minority, NYTIMES.COM (Apr.
20, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/201 1/04/20/gay-marriage-
opponents-now-in-minority/ (reporting on "the fourth credible poll in the past eight months to
show an outright majority of Americans in favor of gay marriage").
115. Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18. 2010, at 40, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa-fact-talbot.
116. Steve Sanders, DOJ Abandons Defense of the 'Defense of Marriage Act': First
Thoughts, U. Cm. LAW ScH. FAc. BLOG (Feb. 23, 2011, 2:06 PM), http://uchicagolaw.
typepad.comlfaculty/2011/02/doj-abandons-defense-of-the-defense-of-marriage-act-first-
thoughts.html.
117. See Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUM. RTS. CAM-
PAIGN (July 6, 2011), http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship-RecognitionLaws_
Map.pdf.
118. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
119. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
120. See HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
June 20121 1439
Michigan Law Review
of such other State."12' More mini-DOMAs-now more often in the form
of state constitutional amendments, and thereby intended to preclude or
limit review by state judiciaries-were passed after Massachusetts legal-
ized same-sex marriage in 2003 and Republican political operatives
decided to emphasize same-sex marriage as a wedge issue in the 2004 and
2006 elections. Thus, as a practical matter, the "sensible approach to
[same-sex marriage] recognition," which would weigh the necessity and
importance of the state's interest in nonrecognition against the couple's
own interests in the integrity of their family life, "is [now] precluded in
most jurisdictions.1 22
A number of conflicts commentators have argued that states are abus-
ing the public policy exception (which, in modem practice, has come to
refer to all forms of marriage nonrecognition, whether by judicial decision
or majoritarian lawmaking).,2 3 Linda Silberman maintains that "[s]tates
with 'defense of marriage' acts should not further their own policies at the
expense of the legitimate interests of other states and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties" and that "states that choose to prohibit same-sex
marriage should not undermine the rights of newly-arriving couples from
established marriages in other states that bestowed marital status upon their
residents and domiciliaries."'124 Similarly, Koppelman maintains that a state
may not invoke the public policy exception merely because it finds another
state's law "repugnant": "Since the repugnance rationale for the public poli-
cy rule makes [national] uniformity impossible, it can have no legitimate
place in interstate choice of law decisions, such as whether to recognize a
marriage valid in another state."' 25 Such a "rule could only be justified by
relying on the ... rationale .. . that the foreign state's law ought not to
exist .... [L]aws with this basis have no place in a federal system."'26 And
Larry Kramer argues that the public policy exception as we know it today
violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause 2 7 because it has ballooned from a
narrow, judge-made tool into a capacious loophole that allows states to ig-
nore the laws of other states out of mere disagreement with them.12 1
Indeed, measured by the standards that traditionally govemed the public
policy exception, mini-DOMAs are hard to justify. While same-sex marriage
will continue to be a subject of keen legal and political disagreement, as an
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
122. Grossman, supra note 76, at 436-37.
123. E.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972 (1997) ("After all, it makes absolutely no
difference from the perspective of either the parties or other states whether the decision that
some law is too offensive to apply comes from a state's courts or from its legislature.").
124. Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153
U. PA. L. REv. 2195, 2214 (2005).
125. KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 26.
126. Koppelman, supra note 70, at 964.
127. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
128. See Kramer, supra note 123.
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objective matter it can no longer be regarded as something that "by the
common voice of civilized nations" is "vicious past toleration," "menaces
the public welfare," or "violate[s] some fundamental principle of jus-
tice"' 29-- certainly not when nationwide polls find majority support for
marriage equality, when the government routinely reports statistics on such
marriages, or when Republican and Democratic appointees to a state su-
preme court in the nation's heartland come together to unanimously strike
down a marriage discrimination law, as they did in Iowa in 2009.130 L. Lynn
Hogue notes that, to the extent that contemporary cases uphold the public
policy exception to marriage recognition, these cases are "cloaked in nine-
teenth-century moral and religious language that no longer resonates in our
pluralistic, secular humanistic society irrespective of how closely it may in
fact track widely held contemporary values.' 131 (Hogue, it should be noted,
is a conservative academic and activist who is not a fan of same-sex mar-
riage.) Such "[r]eligious and moral sentiment," he says, "cannot provide an
adequate contemporary normative framework from which to divine public
policy."'32
D. Same-Sex Marriage and the Limits of Conflicts Doctrine
As we have seen, modem conflicts doctrine provides a sensible rule that
nonevasive marriages should be recognized, and if states simply followed
that rule, we would not need to think about the constitutional implications of
nonrecognition. But in most states, the place of celebration rule has been
overridden by categorical statutes and constitutional amendments. These
mini-DOMAs inflict harms not only on married couples but also on their
children, property, and on any market or sector of the broader society that
depends on the basic expectation of certainty and stability in legal relation-
ships. As merely a body of legal rules and scholarship, conflicts doctrine is
powerless to do anything about this problem. Even where they are not pre-
cluded from acting by constitutional amendment, state judges have shown
no inclination to read these laws in light of modem conflicts principles and
thus moderate the effect of mini-DOMAs on migratory couples. In short, the
conflict of laws approach to marriage recognition has been rendered impo-
tent by majoritarian muscle-flexing and has been overtaken by political and
social realities.
Koppelman, who is one of the most prominent and prolific scholars on
this subject, maintains faith in conflicts doctrine to eventually deal rationally
with same-sex marriage, noting that "[tlhere is a well-developed body of law
on the question of whether and when to recognize extraterritorial marriages
129. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
130. See Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
131. L. Lynn Hogue, Examining a Strand of the Public Policy Exception with Constitu-
tional Underpinnings: How the "Foreign Marriage Recognition Exception" Affects the
Interjurisdictional Recognition of Same-Sex "Marriage", 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 449, 452
(2005).
132. Id.
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that are contrary to the forum's public policy.' 13 3 Yet for interracial marriag-
es before Loving, which Koppelman regards as the most appropriate analogy
to same-sex marriage,' 34 there is only one reported case-from 1877---that
actually upheld a nonevasive migratory marriage while the parties were both
alive and seeking to live as a married couple in the new state. 135 Another deci-
sion, in an estate dispute from 1871, recognized a marriage after the
husband's death. 36 One other case discussed by Koppelman rejected recog-
nition of a migratory interracial marriage. 137
Koppelman also suggests that the harsh effects of nonrecognition laws
could be moderated by narrow judicial interpretation-that is, by reading
them as applicable only to evasive marriages '38-but he concedes, "[A] lot
of use will have to be made of this kind of narrowing device because laws
that lash out wildly at gay people seem to keep getting passed."'139 The prob-
lem is that, even though tens of thousands of same-sex couples have married
since 2004, there is no evidence that such judicial narrowing is taking
place.14°
As a potential compromise approach, Koppelman also advocates "nu-
anced conflicts rules,'"'" specifically an "incidents approach" where states
would not be required to recognize same-sex marriages as such but where
they would be required to allow the couple "[a]ny right or obligation of
marriage that can be recharacterized as a nonmarital right-such as a right
to contract, or a parent-child relation, or an obligation created by a judicial
judgment."'142 Notwithstanding the goodwill and political realism behind
133. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Un-
ions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2143, 2144 (2005).
134. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
135. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 28-29, 42-43 (discussing State v. Ross, 76 N.C.
242 (1877)).
136. See id. at 44 (discussing Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68 (1871)).
137. See id. at 46-47 (discussing State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872)).
138. Id. at 151; see also Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riage, the Public Policy Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 105, 135 (2010) ("[M]ini-DOMAs should not be presumed to affect the recognition
of extraterritorial same-sex marriages, unless they explicitly so state.").
139. KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 151. Indeed, three new state constitutional mini-
DOMAs were passed in 2008 in Arizona, California, and Florida. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
140. See Brenda Cossman, Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex Mar-
riages and the Turn Toward the Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2008, at 153,
161 ("Although the conflicts scholars produce sophisticated arguments ... the courts by and
large ignore these doctrinal disputes and arguments, deciding the cases on the basis of a state's
stated opposition to same-sex marriage."). In the end, it is "the underlying politics of same-sex
marriage' not any legal rule or doctrine, that is "dispositive" Id.
141. KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 152.
142. Id. at 110. Other scholars have proposed similar complicated compromises. See,
e.g., Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 98, at 561, 609 (proposing that states enforce the "con-
tractual elements of marriages solemnized elsewhere" but not the status of marriage or its
"local subsidies and tax and regulatory effects").
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such compromises, sorting out marital from nonmarital incidents would be
complicated and require an enormous amount of state-by-state litigation.
And again, there is no evidence so far that courts are interested in creatively
working around nonrecognition laws.143
The bigger problem with such compromises is that they reinforce the
idea that an extant same-sex marriage is inherently unequal to or less valua-
ble than an opposite-sex marriage and less worthy of honor and protection.
Intermediate, compromise steps such as civil unions may make sense as
states continue debating whether to create same-sex marriages. But once a
valid marriage has been created, the idea of compromising over how much
recognition it should receive is foreign to contemporary American experi-
ence. Moreover, such compromises over recognition are reasonable only if
we accept the premise that "[s]ame-sex marriage is not likely to spread very
widely in the United States in the near future" because "[p]ublic opinion is
too strongly against it."'" In fact, this premise has not held up. At the time
Koppelman wrote in 2006, one state (Massachusetts) had authorized same-
sex marriage. Today the number is six plus the District of Columbia. As
public opinion becomes more supportive of same-sex marriage, that number
is likely to grow.
E. Conflict of Laws, State Interests, and Individual Rights
As a bridge to my argument that we should look to the Due Process
Clause to protect extant same-sex marriages, it is helpful to consider why
conflict of laws is not an adequate paradigm for thinking seriously about the
limits of state power over marriages and families.
I have argued elsewhere that conflicts doctrine, along with the related
doctrines of constitutional and statutory full faith and credit, constitute a
"state interests paradigm" that focuses on the interests of states to the ex-
clusion of considerations of individual rights. 145 Conflicts doctrine is
"preoccupied with choosing the proper state to supply the applicable law,
rather than directly searching for the proper law or, much less, for the
proper result."'146 Unlike substantive law, it only "aims at the spatially best
solution," not "the materially best solution."' 47 Consequently, "[w]hen we
143. We should also remember that "[t]he courts of each state are active participants in
the formulation and implementation of local policies. To place in their hands extensive re-
sponsibility for deciding when those policies will yield to and when they will prevail over the
competing policies of sister states seems unsound." William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1963).
144. KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 152.
145. See Steve Sanders, Interstate Recognition of Parent-Child Relationships: The Limits
of the State Interests Paradigm and the Role of Due Process, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F 233, 234
(2011).
146. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION 405
(2006).
147. Id. at 406 (quoting Gerhard Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional
Conflict of Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 615, 616 (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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think about the conflict of laws, we always think in terms of states and their
relations with each other," and "[w]hat we tend to forget is that choice of
law, as every other field of law, ultimately pertains to human relations." 148
Because conflicts doctrine has its roots in international law, "[s]tate relations
are considered to be more important than private relations and therefore are
superposed to them."'149 Viewing conflicts exclusively as a matter of "battles
between states ... closes the mind to the role of the individual,"' 50 even
though "[i]t is the individuals who will feel the consequences of the applica-
tion of a particular law, and it is their interests that are most directly
concerned by the outcome of the dispute."''
Several noted conflicts scholars have wrestled with this problem, albeit
not in the specific context of same-sex marriage. As Lea Brilmayer writes,
"One is hard put to find a serious discussion of 'rights' in the current
academic literature or judicial discussions of choice of law. With a few
notable exceptions, the academic talk is all about 'policies,' or 'interests,' or
'functional analysis.' 152 This is an important problem, Brilmayer
argues, because
[c]hoosing to talk in terms of rights rather than policies or interests repre-
sents a fundamental jurisprudential commitment which is reflected in the
way that concrete problems are resolved .... Rights impose limits on state
authority, protecting individuals from being forced to sacrifice for the good
of society as a whole. They reflect a notion of individual desert that stands
above the instrumental advantage to be achieved by the application of
some particular state's substantive law.'53
In a similar vein, Terry Kogan has written that "the most important consti-
tutional values at issue in choice of law are those related to fairness to the
litigants, not those aimed at accommodating state policy interests."' 54 And
Scott Fruehwald has observed that the minimal constraints that the Supreme
Court has placed on state choice of law have resulted in a privileging of "state
interests over individual liberty interests, contravening the purpose of the Due
Process Clause-the protection of individual liberty."' 55
To be sure, the domestic relations branch of conflicts doctrine holds that,
where marriage is concerned, "the protection of the justified expectations of
the parties is of considerable importance" and "a basic policy underlying the
148. Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles between States: Justify-
ing Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 382-83 (2008).
149. Id. at 399.
150. Id. at 400.
151. Id. at414.
152. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1277
(1989).
153. Id. at 1278.
154. Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness
Over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 681 (1987).
155. Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 39, 56-57 (1998).
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field of marriage."' 6 But this observation, in an interpretive comment to the
Second Restatement, is merely aspirational, and states can and do ignore it.
Based on an extensive historical survey of cases, Lynn Wardle found that in
"inter-jurisdictional conflicts concerning recognition of controversial forms
of domestic relations ... protection of the strong domestic relations policy of
the forum sovereign is the dominant, controlling consideration." '157 Although
respect for established relationships was an "influential consideration[]" and
comity was a "presumption" in the end, "when recognition of a novel form
of domestic relations would directly contradict or seriously impair or defy a
strong public policy of the forum sovereign regarding domestic relations,
that consideration consistently controlled the outcome.' 5 8
Consider, too, that the Supreme Court "rarely intervenes" to protect
"nonforum state interests, or the interest of nonforum litigants, that are dis-
rupted by parochial state conflicts decisions."'5 9 Indeed, "a state's decision
to decide an issue under its own law and not another's is today practically
immune from constitutional scrutiny. 160
Such a regime seems ill suited for adjudicating the questions of individ-
ual rights and liberty that are inherent in our modem understanding of
marriage and family, because it artificially maximizes state power and con-
trol. It allows states to achieve through conflicts law a degree of hegemony
over questions of marriage and family that they could not legitimately attain
through substantive law that is subject to constitutional scrutiny. To deal
with the phenomenon of same-sex marriage fairly and rationally, it is neces-
sary to break out of the state interests paradigm of conflicts thinking and
look instead to the liberty and privacy guarantees of the Constitution.
III. DISTINGUISHING MARRIAGE CREATION
FROM MARRIAGE RECOGNITION
It is bad to be denied the right to marry the person you choose, but it
seems far worse to marry that person and then have the marriage summarily
taken away from you. To understand why the Due Process Clause should
protect intact marriages against interference in mini-DOMA states, it is nec-
essary to appreciate how marriage creation differs from marriage
recognition and how refusing to license a marriage differs from nullifying
one. Conceptually, these distinctions are not difficult, but appreciating them
is critical for breaking out of the state interests paradigm of conflicts think-
ing. We are accustomed to the prerogative of states to stipulate rather than
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. b (1971).
157. Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy
in Inter-Jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU L. REV.
1855, 1903-04 (2008).
158. Id. at 1904.
159. Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271,
271 (1996).
160. James Y Stem, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L. REV.
1509, 1510 (2008).
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reason. But once we understand marriage recognition as a question of con-
stitutional significance, it becomes clear why mini-DOMA states should be
required to justify the harms they seek to inflict on extant marriages.
A. Affirmation Versus Interference
In one of the few federal cases to consider the validity of a nonrecogni-
tion law, a district court in Florida dismissed a complaint brought by two
women who had married in Massachusetts and sought recognition of the
marriage in Florida.6 ' The court rejected their claims because no controlling
precedent "acknowledge[d] or establish[ed] a constitutional right to enter
into a same-sex marriage."162 In coming to this conclusion, the court ad-
dressed the wrong question. The plaintiffs were not asking Florida to allow
them to "enter into a same-sex marriage"-they already had one. They were
simply trying to stop Florida from effectively taking their marriage away
from them. Yet there was no separate constitutional principle, other than the
"right to marry," to which the court could look.
Why has marriage recognition not previously been conceptualized as a
constitutional question? One theory may be that after the Supreme Court
addressed interracial marriage in Loving-which was, remember, a recogni-
tion case, not a right-to-marry case' 63-states were not voiding or denying
recognition to any other category of marriages (including those based on
age, consanguinity, or polygamy) in a way that was visible or frequent
enough to draw the attention of federal courts or the broader society. Recall
that before same-sex marriage came on the scene, the public policy excep-
tion to marriage recognition had largely fallen into disuse. 64
At first blush, it might seem odd to suggest that a migratory same-sex
marriage should be recognized in a state that prohibits same-sex marriage
for its own residents. But there is no legal or cognitive dissonance in this
idea-indeed, it is the very principle behind the place of celebration rule,
and as a practical matter, states have long lived with this compromise. As a
New York state appellate court noted in a 2008 case that recognized a same-
sex marriage that a New York resident had procured in Canada (an evasive
marriage, it should be noted),
Under th[e] "marriage-recognition" rule, New York has recognized a mar-
riage between an uncle and his niece "by the half blood," common-law
marriages valid under the laws of other states, a marriage valid under the
161. See Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
162. Id. at 1309.
163. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2-5 (1967). To recount the story briefly, in
1958, Mildred Jeter, an African-American woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, married
in Washington, D.C., then returned to Virginia and established their home. Virginia not only
refused to recognize interracial marriages, it criminalized them. The Lovings were prosecuted
and pled guilty. The judge suspended their sentence on the condition that they leave the state.
The Lovings' legal fight to return home to Virginia took them all the way to the Supreme
Court. My thanks to Mae Kuykendall for the point that Loving was a recognition case.
164. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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law of the Province of Ontario, Canada of a man and a woman both under
the age of 18, and a "proxy marriage" valid in the District of Columbia, all
of which would have been invalid if solemnized in New York."1
65
In conflicts doctrine, "the question whether a marriage can be legally cele-
brated in a jurisdiction is entirely distinct from the question whether the
marriage should be given legal effect in the state."' 16 6
The key premise of my argument here is that the same distinction-
creating versus recognizing-also is supportable under constitutional due
process doctrine. The dignitary and practical consequences are much differ-
ent between marriage denial and marriage nullification, and thus so is the
balance of interests between the individual and the state.
The Due Process Clause is often regarded as a shield of negative liberty
against undue state interference in the individual's life. But Carlos Ball has
suggested that the "right to marry" has a "positive component" because "[i]t
is State action that creates the very institution that makes the exercise of the
fundamental right to liberty in the context of marriage possible."' 67 A de-
mand for a marriage license is not a demand that the state leave you alone,
in the manner of a negative liberty. It is, rather, a demand for official affir-
mation, based on an understanding that marriage is, for many people, a
"unique expressive resource."' 68 It is a petition that the state use its power to
alter one's legal status. In the first American decision authorizing same-sex
marriage, the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed that "the government
creates civil marriage .... In a real sense, there are three partners to every
civil marriage: two willing spouses and an approving State."'69 And as mar-
riage historian Nancy Cott writes,
At the same time that any marriage represents personal love and commit-
ment, it participates in the public order .... To be marriage, the institution
requires public affirmation. It requires public knowledge-at least some
publicity beyond the couple themselves; that is why witnesses are required
for the ceremony and why wedding bells ring. More definitively, legal mar-
riage requires state sanction, in the license and the ceremony. 7
Marriage's public dimension explains in part why gay and lesbian advo-
cates are fighting to expand the institution and why traditionalists are
fighting to confine its meaning: "Both traditionalists and progressives are
165. Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (App. Div. 2008) (citations
omitted).
166. Joanna L. Grossman, New York's Highest Court Upholds Benefits for Same-Sex
Spouses in Narrow Ruling, FINDLAW (Nov. 24, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/
20091124.html (emphasis added).
167. Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Mar-
riage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1184, 1187, 1206 (2004).
168. David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage
as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 928-929 (2001).
169. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003).
170. Cor-, supra note 39, at 1-2.
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motivated by the symbolic legitimacy and status offered by civil mar-
riage."'
17 1
The constitutional "right to marry" has always been murky. Although the
Supreme Court has said the right is "fundamental," it has also hedged its
position by giving a wide berth to state interests, explaining that "reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." '172 But the Court has not
explained what makes a marriage-entry regulation "reasonable," or how we
can tell when it "significantly interfere[s] with" the ability to enter marriage.
Moreover, in the small number of marriages cases they have decided, the
Justices "have drawn on both due process and equal protection rationales,
sometimes alternating between them, sometimes relying on both, and some-
times explicitly invoking neither," with the result that "both the rationale for
[the fundamental right to marry] and its structure have remained unclear."173
Cass Sunstein goes so far as to argue that the right to marry "ought not
to be protected as a matter of substantive due process," and that "[i]f a state
abolished the official institution of marriage, it would be acting constitution-
ally," because "[t]he state is under no obligation to confer either the
expressive or the material benefits of marriage." 174 At the same time, he
acknowledges that "[slome of the associational benefits now connected with
marriage could, and probably must, be respected even if marriage did not
exist."175 True fundamental rights, Sunstein writes, "are generally rights to
be free from government intrusion"; unlike marriage creation, "they do not
require affirmative provision by the state." 176 Rather, they simply "require[]
governmental noninterference." 17  For this reason, it is a misnomer to equate
the right to marry with the substantive due process right to privacy. Doing so
reflects what Richard Posner calls "[t]he curious appropriation of the word
privacy to describe what is not privacy in the ordinary sense but rather free-
dom."'178
By contrast, a right of marriage recognition is much closer to a negative
liberty. At the most basic level, it is a demand that a state not interfere with
an intact legal relationship among members of a nuclear family. The contin-
gent and uncertain right to marry stands in contrast to the Supreme Court's
decisions that protect privacy within the context of extant marital, family,
and intimate relationships. The Court does not lightly declare entire areas of
human endeavor to be "sanctuar[ies] from unjustified interference by the
171. Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim within the Same-Sex Marriage Con-
troversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 359 (2008).
172. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
173. Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right To Marry, 158 U.
PA. L. REv. 1375, 1386-87 (2010).
174. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2081, 2118 (2005).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2094.
177. Id.
178. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 335 (1992).
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State"' 7 9 or "realm[s] of personal liberty which the government may not
enter."18° But it has placed extant marital, family, and intimate relationships
in this space. Even Justice Scalia has said that "sanctity would not be too
strong a term" for "relationships that develop within the unitary family."' 1
In the line of due process decisions that culminated in Lawrence, the Court
almost appears to have recognized, at least rhetorically, what libertarian the-
orist Randy Barnett has called a "presumption of liberty" 82 -a paradigm
that "places the burden on the government to establish the necessity and
propriety of any infringement on individual freedom,"'83 and which virtually
never settles for mere rational basis scrutiny.
The right-to-marry cases concern access to a state-created institution,
and the Court has signaled deference toward states to prescribe the prerequi-
sites for marriage. By contrast, the family and relationship privacy cases
protect a right to be left alone: to keep the state out of one's marital relation-
ship (Griswold), parenting decisions (Meyer, Pierce), and reproductive and
sexual choices (Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, Lawrence); to maintain relation-
ships whose "meaning" the government may not "define" (Lawrence); and
to live with one's own family members and be free from the government's
attempts to define and coercively enforce the makeup of a permissible fami-
ly (Stanley, Moore). In Zablocki, Justice Powell expressed the view that an
existing marriage carried a higher liberty interest than did the right to enter
marriage. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell said:
Although the cases cited in the [majority opinion] indicate that there is a
sphere of privacy or autonomy surrounding an existing marital relationship
into which the State may not lightly intrude, they do not necessarily sug-
gest that the same barrier of justification blocks regulation of the
conditions of entry into.., the marital bond.1"4
The analogy of marriage recognition to negative liberty is imperfect, to
be sure. For one thing, the Court's family privacy jurisprudence is "frag-
mented" and "fail[s] to identify and adhere consistently to a single standard
179. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
180. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
181. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion).
182. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004).
183. Id. at 259-60; cf Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution:
Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 (2003) ("If the approach the Court took
in the case is followed in other cases in the future, we have in Lawrence nothing short of a
constitutional revolution, with implications reaching far beyond the 'personal liberty' at issue
here."); Robert J. Delahunty & Antonio F. Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State: The
Supreme Court's Vision of the Police Power in the Age of Globalization, 42 Hous. L. REV.
637, 690 (2005) (arguing that "the Court's individual rights jurisprudence has moved away in
recent years from recognizing the beliefs and practices of the community as sources of norma-
tivity and value and as a legitimate basis for legislation" and that the Court "seems inclined
... to constitutionalize much of John Stuart Mill's libertarianism").
184. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397 n.1 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added).
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of constitutional review." 185 For another, if one state recognizes another
state's marriage, it must also provide the normal state-created incidents of
marriage, a mix of legal privileges and responsibilities that give some com-
ponent of affirmative recognition to the marriage. But as I discuss in Section
IV.B.3, the primary purpose served by most of these incidents is to safe-
guard the integrity, privacy, and longevity of marriages. Functionally, they
express the state's support for marriage, but they rest on neutral principles of
promoting commitment, responsibility, and stability in family relationships;
they only favor heterosexual marriage if the state chooses to restrict them to
heterosexuals. When everything else in a state's marriage policy points to-
ward the goal of preserving and protecting the rights of married individuals
so that their marriages succeed, laws specifically aimed at voiding or deny-
ing recognition to intact marriages without cause or due process appear all
the more perverse and unacceptable. 186
B. Forcing the State to Justify Its Harm
When a state withholds a marriage license, it circumscribes the individ-
ual's life choices; it classifies the individual in a way that denies the
possibility of access to social recognition and public benefits. But this is
different from the harm a state inflicts when it voids or denies recognition to
an extant marriage. As Koppelman notes, "A rule that same-sex marriages are
void the moment one of the parties changes her domicile would have absurd
results."'18 7 If two people who were once married are suddenly rendered legal
strangers to one another, property rights are potentially altered, spouses dis-
inherited, children put at risk, and financial, medical, and personal plans and
decisions thrown into turmoil. One spouse might be prevented from making
emergency medical decisions for the other. Some states might not honor
contracts benefiting a same-sex spouse, and same-sex couples might be
"subject to having the[ir] children snatched from them and placed in foster
care." '188 Should the couple choose to exit the relationship someday, access
to divorce may not be possible.' 89 Moreover, "[a]s a legal stranger, your
185. Meyer, supra note 69, at 532.
186. See Lois A. Weithom, Can a Subsequent Change in Law Void a Marriage that Was
Valid at Its Inception? Considering the Legal Effect of Proposition 8 on California's Existing
Same-Sex Marriages, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1098 (2009) (arguing that "marital law is struc-
tured to reinforce" the expectation that a marriage should endure, and "[i]t would, therefore,
be strange indeed... for the state to suddenly become a unilateral force mandating retroactive
voiding of marriages that were unquestionably valid at their inception").
187. Koppelman, supra note 133, at 2155.
188. Stanley E. Cox, Nine Questions About Same-Sex Marriage Conflicts, 40 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 361,374 (2006).
189. See Joanna L. Grossman, No Gay Divorcees in Texas: An Appellate Court Refuses
to Dissolve a Same-Sex Marriage, FindLaw (Sept. 13, 2010), http://writ.corporate.
findlaw.com/grossman/20100913.html ("Can a couple that marries in one jurisdiction get
divorced in another? ... [Flor same-sex couples, the answer is no better than 'Maybe' (and in
many cases, it is clearly 'No') due to the patchwork of inconsistent state laws regarding same-
sex marriage.").
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partner stands behind children, parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts and
uncles, cousins, and even the state in terms of priority and legal standing,"
and "this absence of relationship can have significant bearing in cases of
relationship dissolution, child custody, second parent adoption, inheritance,
and health care decision-making."' 90
Conflicts doctrine, having no enforcement mechanisms, is impotent to
address all these harms. 1 But framing marriage recognition as a matter of
constitutional due process brings individual interests into the equation and
forces the state to justify the harm it seeks to impose. In a substantive due
process case, the core of the analysis is assessing whether the state's interest
in maintaining a liberty-infringing policy is important and necessary enough
to justify the specific harm that the plaintiff is forced to suffer.
To be sure, my view of marriage recognition as something that requires
balancing state and individual interests swims against the tide of conven-
tional wisdom, which simply accepts that a state has the authority to convert
a married couple to the status of legal strangers. Mark Rosen argues that
"the prospect that two states may disagree about what constitutes a valid
marriage is not terribly daunting."'' 92 Even "[i]f it seems odd that two per-
sons may be married in the eyes of one state but not others," that problem
merely "reflects the fact that different political communities feel differently
about what constitutes a valid marriage," something that should be respected
as a matter of "federalism's commitments to political diversity."193 Similarly,
Lynn Hogue says that "[p]ublic policy is so integral a part of the decision of
a state as to who can be married, to whom and under what circumstances,
that no state can dictate the terms of that relationship for another."194
But these positions are sound only if we assume that the law should
view marriage recognition solely in terms of a clash of state interests, rather
than a clash between the state and the individual. The relevant question is
not whether a state has an interest in its definition of marriage in the ab-
stract. As to persons who seek new marriages under its laws, it surely does
have such an interest. But for marriage recognition, the relevant question is
whether the state has a sufficiently important and necessary interest in its
marriage policy to justify the harms it proposes to inflict on already-married
couples. "When a state favors its interests over individuals' interests in
190. Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS.
L. REV. 421, 439 (2008) (footnote omitted).
191. See supra notes 145-158 and accompanying text.
192. Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional:
Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the Con-
stitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 997 (2006).
193. Id.
194. L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex "Mar-
riage": How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 37
(1998).
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choice of law, it is using the individual as a means to an end."'195 When states
behave in this way, constitutional scrutiny is required.
IV. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
To this point, I have explained that marriage and family are protected by
well-established constitutional principles, and that nonrecognition laws rep-
resent an intrusion by the state into extant family relationships. I have also
explained that reliance on conflicts principles cannot provide a rational and
expeditious solution to the problem of migratory same-sex marriages. By
breaking out of the state interests paradigm, and by acknowledging the dif-
ference between marriage creation and marriage recognition, we can
appreciate the harm that nonrecognition laws inflict and why states should
be required to justify that harm as necessary to significantly advancing an
important interest.
In this Part, I discuss four principles of constitutional due process that
support a right of marriage recognition. I then consider the interests that a
state might assert in opposing this right for same-sex couples. But first, I
explain the level of scrutiny that is appropriate for this analysis.
A. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
Marriage nonrecognition laws should be scrutinized under the Due Pro-
cess Clause so that the interests of a state in its anti-same-sex marriage
policy are weighed against the interests of the marital parties in the contin-
ued existence of their marriage. A flexible, intermediate level of scrutiny,
requiring the state to advance important interests and show that marriage
nullification is necessary to significantly further those interests, is the ap-
propriate judicial test.
In its marriage and family privacy cases other than Loving (where race
discrimination was the overriding concern), the Supreme Court, David
Meyer argues, has applied neither strict scrutiny nor mere rational basis
scrutiny, but instead a more "flexible" burden of justification for the
government. 196 For example, in both Moore (a family case) and Zablocki (a
marriage case), he says,
[T]he Court departed from the usual language of "compelling" interests
and "narrow tailoring" in describing the governing review, substituting
ambiguous verbiage in its place. In Moore, for example, having found a
burden on Mrs. Moore's fundamental right of family kinship, the Court
held only that it would then "examine carefully the importance of the gov-
ernmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by
the challenged regulation." Perhaps these formulations meant to imply
195. Fruehwald, supra note 155, at 60; see also Brilmayer, supra note 152, at 1291
("The problem with consequentialist approaches to choice of law is that the individual is treat-
ed merely as a means to an end.").
196. See David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right to Public Recognition of Family Relation-
ships? The Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51 VILL. L. Rav. 891, 915 (2006).
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strict scrutiny, but the Court's pointed ambiguity suggested to some readers
a commitment to an intermediate standard of review."'
Moreover, in Lawrence, "the Court's failure to employ any clearly rec-
ognizable standard of scrutiny ... has led several scholars to detect a more
general breakdown of the established 'tiers' of scrutiny even beyond the
context of family privacy."198 And Randy Barnett writes that in Lawrence,
the Court broke "free at last of the post-New Deal constitutional tension
between the 'presumption of constitutionality,' on one hand, and 'fundamen-
tal rights,' on the other." 199 The majority "did not begin by assuming the
statute was constitutional. But neither did they call the liberty at issue 'fun-
damental.' "200 Rather, "the Court took the much simpler tack of requiring
the state to justify its statute, whatever the status of the right at issue. 20 1
In a recent case dealing with an individual service member's substantive
due process challenge to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the
Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed Lawrence and similarly concluded that the
"Court's rationale for its holding-the inquiry analysis that it was apply-
ing-is inconsistent with rational basis review."2 2 The appellate court also
took note of a post-Lawrence substantive due process case, Sell v. United
States,2°3 which involved forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to a
mentally ill criminal defendant. In Sell, the Supreme Court recognized a
"significant constitutionally protected liberty interest" (though not a funda-
mental right) in "avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs. 12 4 The Court held that such intrusion on personal interests by the
government was permissible only where it was "necessary significantly to
further important governmental trial-related interests. 2 5 In other words, a
mere legitimate interest would not suffice. Reading Sell and Lawrence togeth-
er, the Ninth Circuit concluded that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate
where "the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and private lives
of homosexuals. '2 6 Specifically, the appellate court held that "the government
must advance an important governmental interest, the intrusion must signifi-
cantly further that interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further
that interest. °207 This standard informs my discussion in the sections that
follow.
197. Id.
198. Id. at917.
199. Barnett, supra note 183, at 21.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 E3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008).
203. 539 U.S. 166(2003).
204. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Id. at 179.
206. Witt, 527 F3d at 819.
207. Id.
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In suggesting a right of marriage recognition, I am not making an argu-
ment under Equal Protection Clause doctrine, and thus my argument does
not depend on finding gays and lesbians to be a suspect class. Nonetheless,
there is some element of equal protection thinking in the analysis. For ex-
ample, assume that two married couples-Evan and John, and Harry and
Louise-migrate to a mini-DOMA state. The state will, of course, recognize
Harry and Louise's marriage without anyone really thinking about it. As for
Evan and John, I am not arguing that their marriage must be recognized be-
cause they were similarly situated to Harry and Louise in their capacity to
enter marriage. That assertion would simply collapse into a right-to-marry
argument under the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, what makes the two
couples similarly situated is their status as parties to an extant, valid mar-
riage. A right of marriage recognition would take hold only after a couple
had been validly married, and it would place a shield around that status,
forcing a state to provide important justifications before voiding the mar-
riage or denying it recognition.
One of the criticisms of recognizing liberty interests under the Due Pro-
cess Clause is that those interests-for example, the right to be free of
sodomy laws or certain abortion restrictions-typically are recognized in the
teeth of positive law. But the right of marriage recognition simply prevents
discrimination in the allocation of marriage benefits and duties that are al-
ready created by positive law.20 8
The use of due process to prevent states from improperly excluding
same-sex marriages from the longstanding place of celebration rule reflects
how, as Cass Sunstein writes, due process
has been interpreted largely ... to protect traditional practices against
short-run departures. The clause has therefore been associated with a par-
ticular conception of judicial review, one that sees courts as safeguards
against novel developments brought about by temporary majorities who
are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history.2'
Under due process analysis, a "highly relevant" consideration is "wheth-
er an existing or time-honored convention, described at the appropriate level
of generality, is violated by the practice under attack. '210 In a similar vein,
Kenneth Karst argues that although we typically think of "group subordina-
tion" as a problem addressed by the Equal Protection Clause, the
"antisubordination values" of equal citizenship "have contributed to individ-
ual liberties" and that "concerns about group subordination have profoundly
influenced the doctrinal growth of substantive due process. ''211 In the Four-
teenth Amendment, he concludes, "'liberty' means equal liberty."'21 2 And the
208. My thanks to Will Baude for this point.
209. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relation-
ship between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1988).
210. Id.
211. Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REv. 99, 102 (2007).
212. Id. at 133.
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Supreme Court acknowledged a similar principle in Lawrence, observing
that "[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in im-
portant respects. '213 In a recent article, Kenji Yoshino argues that the Court
has been "shut[ting] doors in its equality jurisprudence in the name of plu-
ralism anxiety," but has at the same time "opened doors in its liberty
jurisprudence to compensate. 214
If marriage recognition is a significant liberty interest, that suggests it
should be a neutral principle applicable to all marriages, not a right synthe-
sized exclusively for the benefit of gays and lesbians. I agree. If this is so,
however, might the same rule force states to recognize incestuous, polyga-
mous, or other "taboo" marriages? Such outcomes are not a necessary
consequence of the rule, and we should not be detained by such red her-
rings. First, as I demonstrated in Section II.B.2, in contemporary practice
such marriages are very rarely an issue, because no state licenses polygamy
or truly "incestuous" marriages,2 1 5 while seven jurisdictions currently li-
cense same-sex marriages. More importantly, the flexible, intermediate form
of scrutiny I have suggested leaves ample room to consider state interests
that are distinctively implicated by polygamy or incest. For one thing, the
constitutionality of criminal bans on polygamy and incest remain securely in
place. (Remember that no state authorized same-sex marriage before the
Court struck down sodomy laws in 2003.) Polygamy also has been associat-
ed with "abusive impact on children, '216 while same-sex marriages have not.
Other state interests furthered by restrictions on polygamy may include
"[m]aintaining the binary nature of marriage" and "equality of the sexes. '217
And of course, incest involves concerns over coercion and voluntary con-
sent. In short, it is entirely plausible that a state could assert important
interests that were significantly advanced by continuing to deny recognition
to such marriages. A right of marriage recognition would simply put states
to their proof, which is not an unreasonable demand where something as
important as a marriage is at stake.
And so we should deal with the problem that is actually in front of us.
The constitutional protections the Court has already extended to gays and
lesbians and their relationships, most notably in Lawrence, along with the
growing public support for same-sex marriage and the empirical reality that
tens of thousands of such marriages have already been performed, all sharply
distinguish same-sex marriage in the contemporary United States from any
other "taboo" unions. Accordingly, my discussion in the next two Sections of
213. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
214. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REv. 747, 750 (2011).
215. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text.
216. Amy Fry, Comment, Polygamy in America: How the Varying Legal Standards Fail
to Protect Mothers and Children from Its Abuses, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 967, 969 (2010).
217. Elizabeth Larcano, Note, A "Pink" Herring: The Prospect of Polygamy Following
the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CONN. L. REv. 1065, 1068 (2006).
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this Part reflects the specific context of extant same-sex marriages and the
individual and state interests they implicate.
B. Due Process Principles Supporting a Right of Marriage Recognition
1. Reasonable Expectations and Reliance -
As the place of celebration rule recognizes, marriage implicates im-
portant individual interests based on reliance and reasonable expectations.
When two individuals marry, they make long-term plans for their lives, fi-
nances, property, and children. As one state high court observed, "In an age
of widespread travel and ease of mobility, it would create inordinate confu-
sion and defy the reasonable expectations of citizens whose marriage is
valid in one state to hold that marriage invalid elsewhere. 218 Marriage nulli-
fication laws "frustrate[] rational planning" because "[t]here are significant
costs when actors ... are forced to make decisions without knowing what
law governs their actions." '219 As one prominent conflicts scholar explains,
"Couples moving from state to state usually rightly anticipate that their sta-
tus does not change. Marriages, after all, are not like fishing licenses where
one needs a new one in each new state and with each new season. '22° And as
a leading treatise observes, "Human mobility ought not to jeopardize the
reasonable expectations of those relying on an assumed family pattern. '22' A
person seeking to get married, of course, has no such reliance and expecta-
tion interests; such interests arise only once a marriage has been formed.
Such reliance and expectation interests are perhaps the most obvious way
that an existing marriage differs from a potential marriage.
One of the purposes of the Due Process Clause traditionally has been to
protect a party's reasonable expectations when they are endangered by gov-
ernment action,222 and so it is appropriate to look to due process to protect
extant marital relationships. A right of marriage recognition also is con-
sistent with an understanding of due process as grounded in principles of
"reasonable societal reliance. 2 23 Such an approach "look[s] to the existing
218. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974); see also Margaret F Brinig
& June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TuL. L. REv. 855, 856
(1988) ("[T]he law of domestic relations-like the law governing many other consensual
relationships-has always protected the 'reliance interest,' that is, the parties' change of posi-
tion in reliance on the joint enterprise.").
219. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice
of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1991).
220. Borchers, supra note 75, at 354.
221. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 11, at 560.
222. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 336 (1990)
(explaining that parties' "reasonable expectations" are protected by the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, at least when the expectations are "so widely shared
as to be uncontroversial").
223. Brandon R. Johnson, Note, "Emerging Awareness" After the Emergence of Rob-
erts: Reasonable Societal Reliance in Substantive Due Process Inquiry, 71 BROOK. L. REv.
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rules and understanding to determine whether the plaintiff could objectively
rely on continuing the questioned practice,' 224 based on practices in which
"citizens have developed a real and rational trust."25 A right of marriage
recognition, which simply tracks the familiar place of celebration rule and
the ordinary expectations of married couples, is consistent with such an ap-
proach.
A couple's expectations and reliance interests take concrete form when
it comes to the property interests-bank accounts, real estate, inheritance
rights-that are intertwined with marriage. As the California Supreme
Court explained in a decision upholding the validity of same-sex marriag-
es that had occurred before voters approved a constitutional mini-DOMA,
married couples "acquire[] vested property rights as lawfully married
spouses with respect to a wide range of subjects, including, among many
others, employment benefits, interests in real property, and inheritanc-
es. 226 Extinguishing a marriage without divorce or due process could wipe
out these property interests if they are not separately secured by contracts
or wills.
Going a step further, it does not seem far-fetched to suggest that a mar-
riage itself could be regarded as a form of property interest that cannot be
taken away without due process.2 27 After all, the Supreme Court's procedur-
al due process jurisprudence has given constitutional "property interest"
protection to things like welfare benefits228 and tenured government em-
ployment. 229 The basic principle is that once state law creates a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to something, the state cannot just unilaterally take
that thing away; it must do so under fair procedures. 230 The problem with
1587, 1591 (2006) (describing reasonable societal reliance as "citizens hav[ing] developed a
real and rational trust in the protected nature" of certain practices (emphasis omitted)).
224. Id. at 1596 (emphasis omitted); see also Shreve, supra note 159, at 289 ("When we
turn to the numerous conflicts policies that are capable of a second life under the Constitution,
the policy that chosen law not disturb the reasonable expectations of a party seems a natural
choice.")
225. Johnson, supra note 223, at 1591 (emphasis omitted).
226. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009); see also Callahan v. Callahan, 15
S.E. 727, 731 (S.C. 1892) ("[W]ithout entering now into the argument whether marriage is
only a political and social status, we cannot doubt that, whatever else it may be, under our law,
it is as well 'a civil contract,' and confers valuable vested rights."). Most state courts have
rejected the idea that spouses have a vested right in the status of marriage itself, though many
of these cases date back to a time when the authority of the state over marriage was considered
absolute. See, e.g., Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 50 (1857) ("[A]s between husband and wife,
there is no constitutional provision protecting the marriage itself, or the property incident to it,
from legislative control, by general law, upon such terms as public policy may dictate.").
227. Alternatively, one commentator suggests that an extant marriage should be regarded
as private property protected by the Takings Clause. Goutam U. Jois, Note, Marital Status as
Property: Toward a New Jurisprudence for Gay Rights, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509
(2006).
228. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
229. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972).
230. Id. at 577.
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this argument as applied to marriage recognition is that the Court has not
extended this doctrine to property interests that are acquired in one state and
later taken to another state.23 Thus, there is no authority that the Constitu-
tion will step in if State B confiscates as illegal contraband the fireworks that
were perfectly legal for you to buy in State A. On the other hand, mar-
riage-a relationship the Supreme Court has described as "intimate to the
degree of being sacred"232 -seems entitled to more regard than contraband
personal property. At any rate, the better path is to regard an extant marriage
as a liberty interest, rather than property, because Due Process Clause liber-
ty is the framework for the protection the Court has given to existing family
and intimate relationships.
The argument might be made that same-sex couples do not reasonably
have the same expectations concerning their marriages as heterosexual cou-
ples; most states still prohibit same-sex marriage, the argument might go,
and so "no same-sex couple can plausibly plead 'surprise,' in light of the
flurry of anti-recognition statutes. '23  Of course, there is no agreed-upon
legal definition of "reasonable expectations," and arguments about them
can quickly become circular. Larry Kramer observes that "[s]tatements
about the parties' reasonable expectations mask normative judgments re-
flecting what a court believes the parties ought to expect.."234 But there are
good reasons why migratory same-sex couples who did not evade the law
of their domicile should not be excluded from a reasonable expectation in
the durability of their marriages.
First, most people are not conflicts scholars. Most married couples move
freely across state borders without giving it a second thought, and so even if
many same-sex couples are aware that they cannot get married in most
states, it is not necessarily obvious they should be on notice that a move to a
new state could effectively make their marriage vanish. The idea that an ex-
tant legal family relationship can be nullified by operation of law is foreign
to modem American experience and constitutional jurisprudence.
Second, the legal landscape for same-sex marriage in the United States is
complex and rapidly changing. A mere seven years ago, same-sex marriage
was available in one jurisdiction, Massachusetts; today it is available in seven.
Same-sex marriage was legal for a while in both California and Maine, but
now it is not; California still offers the statutory benefits and protections of
marriage, but calls it domestic partnership. 235 Vermont and Connecticut once
231. That is, unless one looks all the way back to Dred Scott, but that seems a dubious
precedent to rely on. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450-51 (1857) (discussing
constitutional protection for the right to transport property, in the form of a slave, from one
state to another).
232. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
233. Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REv.
1996, 2051 (2003).
234. Kramer, supra note 222, at 336.
235. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
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offered only civil unions to same-sex couples; now they offer marriage.236
Maryland will recognize same-sex marriages even though it will not perform
them, a stance that New York also maintained until its legislature voted to au-
thorize same-sex marriages in 201 1.237 Meanwhile, at any given moment
there are lawsuits and legislative initiatives pending in various states that
could redraw the map yet again.238 Under these conditions, it is neither prac-
tical nor fair to subject same-sex couples to a quantum of confusion and
uncertainty that other couples would not tolerate.
In short, I am arguing that the reliance and expectation interests in a
marriage should be evaluated normatively and objectively. After all, equal-
marriage states have not created a separate new category in their laws for
same-sex unions. A marriage is simply a marriage, and all marriages should
exist on equal footing. Moreover, none of the neutral, utilitarian policies
behind the longstanding place of celebration rule-such as assuring stability
and predictability in legal relationships, allowing free movement around the
country, and preventing casual evasion of marital responsibilities-apply
with any less force to same-sex marriages. Accordingly, same-sex couples
should be entitled to expect nothing less than other couples. The alternative
view-that a couple's reliance interests and expectations in their marriage
should vary from state to state-is unsound, because it forces the couple to
waive their marital rights as the price of taking a new job, pursuing educa-
tion, caring for family, or engaging in any of the other routine life activities
and responsibilities that lead people to establish domicile in a new state.23 9
2. Marital and Family Privacy
Under the right of marital privacy provided by Griswold, a state may not
invade any married couple's relationship by snooping in their bedroom or
policing their sexual intimacy. But that same state can, based on nothing
more than the disapproval of a governing majority, declare the marriage of a
same-sex couple to be a legal nullity. Intuitively-that is, so long as we are
no longer trapped in the state interests paradigm of conflicts thinking-this
makes no sense. Is it really far-fetched to suggest that, when a state purports
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. As this Article was going to press, legislators in Maryland and the State of Wash-
ington had approved same-sex marriage, but implementation was on hold pending possible
challenges by voter initiative. Crary, supra note 1. At the same time, California's ban on same-
sex marriage was tied up in protracted federal litigation. Adam Nagourney, Court Strikes
Down Ban on Gay Marriage in California, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), at Al (discussing the
intent of the litigants to bring the case to the Supreme Court).
239. Other commentators have agreed that migratory same-sex couples are entitled to the
benefit of a reasonable expectations rule concerning their marriages. For example, Linda Sil-
berman writes that "[b]ecause of the reliance and expectation interests of the parties that their
marriage was valid under the law of the state of 'domicile at the time of marriage,' that rule
would be the preferable one to govern the incidents of marriage [in a new state]." Linda J.
Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and
Federalism Values, 16 QUINNipIAc L. REv. 191,203 (1996).
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to void or deny recognition to an existing marriage, it has invaded marital
and family privacy? The answer should be no.
To be sure, states have always had the power to regulate existing mar-
riages. But "regulation" falls short of prescribing a law that purports to
nullify a marriage without cause or due process. States do not surveil or
evaluate existing marriages to assure that they are continuing to advance the
state's policy goals, and most couples do not expect to prove up their mar-
riages and submit them for revalidation when they move from one state to
another. In this sense, we expect same-sex couples to put up with a sort of
legal fiction about state power over extant marriages that no one else would.
For most people, marriage regulation is "benevolent, lend[ing] symbolic and
material support to private family commitments."2 4° The "coercive" side of
marriage regulation, which "marshals the state's authority to control and
regulate the most personal aspects of our lives," is "rarely felt" by the "polit-
ical majority."241 American law has moved "toward withdrawal by the state
from much that it has done to regulate marriage," such that "the legal conse-
quences of marriage are becoming harder to distinguish from those of other
comparable intimate associations. 24 2 The point of most regulation is to rein-
force the longevity and durability of the union and to protect the privacy and
integrity of the married couple. 243 With the exception of prohibitions on vio-
lence within families and requirements of some minimum level of spousal
support, "the state recognizes the privacy of the intact marital relationship."2"
This fact makes it all the more anomalous for a state to claim the power to
void or deny recognition to one particular category of marriages.
Marriage nonrecognition laws force us to think seriously about what it
means to declare the existence, as the Court has done numerous times, of a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."2 45 For example, in
Moore,246 one of the most generative family privacy and autonomy cases, 247
the Court struck down a city zoning ordinance that would have prevented a
grandmother from living under the same roof with her grandchildren. Is
240. Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Belonging, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 1690, 1707 (2002)
(reviewing NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
(2000)).
241. Id.
242. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 648-49
(1980).
243. See Weithorn, supra note 186, at 1098.
244. Hamilton, supra note 62, at 323 n.54.
245. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
246. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
247. See Pala Hersey, Moore v. City of East Cleveland: The Supreme Court's Fractured
Paean to the Extended Family, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 57, 61-62 (2004) ("[Moore] has
figured prominently as a precedent in several Supreme Court decisions dealing with 'family
privacy' arguments on behalf of nontraditional relationships. More broadly, the Moore plurali-
ty's position has played a prominent role in some of the Court's most important decisions on
Substantive Due Process .... "(footnote omitted)).
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that a greater or lesser intrusion than nullifying a marriage? In Moore, the
government attempted to disrupt the cohabitation of blood relatives. In a
mini-DOMA state, the government allows a same-sex couple to cohabitate
but renders them legal strangers for all other purposes. In Moore, the plu-
rality opinion explained that when the government "undertakes such
intrusive regulation of the family ... the usual judicial deference to the
legislature is inappropriate," 248 and that, while the family is not beyond
regulation, "when the government intrudes on choices concerning family
living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of
the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation."249 But voiding or declining to recog-
nize a marriage is also a form of "intrusive regulation of the family,"
because converting a married couple into strangers in the eyes of the law
inevitably disrupts lives and relationships in myriad ways. Isn't the enjoy-
ment of an existing marriage a form of "family living arrangement," and if
so, why shouldn't it be protected under the same due process principles that
were underscored so powerfully in Moore?
As a matter of both procedural and substantive due process, a state can-
not terminate a parent's legal rights over her child without a hearing, at
which it must present clear and convincing evidence of unfitness.5 0 But for
all practical purposes, when a state voids or declines to recognize a mar-
riage, it is terminating the spouses' legal rights vis-A-vis each other. A parent
and child form one legal relationship within the nuclear family; two spouses
form another. If the state cannot lightly sever one, why should it be able to
lightly sever the other? After all, the Court has never suggested that the
parent-child relationship is more important or more fundamental than
marriage. Indeed, since the foundational cases of Meyer251 and Pierce,252 the
family privacy cases have tended to discuss them together, emphasizing that
substantive due process protects "relationships that develop within the uni-
tary family. '253 These cases have recognized that "[t]raditional associations
like marriage or the family created zones of privacy.., because State action
there was deemed to threaten the flourishing of a commonly held morality,
not to sustain and uphold it. 254
David Meyer argues that "withholding formal recognition from some re-
lationships, while giving preference to others in a broader regulatory
scheme, can itself be a form of damaging intervention in disfavored family
248. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
249. Id.
250. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 769 (1982); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 293-296.
251. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
252. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
253. E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion).
254. Delahunty & Perez, supra note 183, at 687.
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relationships." '255 The "unique qualities of marriage... [as] demonstrated in
a growing body of social science research, mean that state limitations on
access can in fact impair the dynamics of excluded family relationships. 256
For example, "legal marriage may reconstitute personal identity, leading
spouses to define themselves in part by their commitment to others. ' 257 One
of the many reasons marriage matters to spouses "is that society regards
marriage as the ultimate marker of commitment and permanence. '25 s By
contrast,
[c]ouples who are excluded from marriage ... must construct their rela-
tionship not only without the benefits conferred by marriage, but also in
the face of state-backed norms denigrating the seriousness and substantiali-
ty of all non-marital relationships. In this sense, the state's exclusion of
some persons from marriage, consigning them to occupy indefinitely the
informal status of cohabitation, may not simply deny them a positive bene-
fit, but do them a distinct harm.259
Thus, "[t]he state's relegation of some relationships to a disfavored and dis-
advantaged legal status might rightly be understood as actively destabilizing
those relationships, triggering constitutional scrutiny even under conven-
tional conceptions of family privacy as a negative right. ' 260
The fact that an extant marriage involves two members of the same sex
does not make the privacy interest less compelling. The privacy of an existing
marriage is a neutral principle, because it has nothing to do with favoring cer-
tain ideas about gender roles or heteronormativity. If a state seeks to deny
same-sex couples the same expectations of privacy and autonomy that it
grants to other couples, it is simply making a normative judgment that same-
sex marriages are inferior. "What makes a family relationship or personal
decision worthy of heightened constitutional protection," Meyer argues,
"is not the particular stakes for the individual, but whether society tradi-
tionally has regarded the particular relationship or choice as off-limits
to governmental interference. '2 61 Here, that "relationship or choice" is
properly understood as marriage, not any one form of marriage. As I ex-
plain further in Section IV.B.2, the state's expressive or channeling
interests in marriage-that is, its interests in reserving marriage creation
for heterosexual couples--do not properly operate on an existing marriage.
Lawrence v. Texas becomes relevant here not because the issue of
marriage was presented in Lawrence (it was not), but because Lawrence
brought same-sex relationships under the protection of the Due Process
Clause. Same-sex relationships are now situated within the same "realm of
255. Meyer, supra note 196, at 898. Although he refers to "recognition," Meyer in this
article is actually discussing a right of same-sex couples to marry in the first instance.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 909.
258. Id. at 910.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 919.
261. Meyer, supra note 69, at 535-36.
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personal liberty which the government may not enter" that was already
anchored by the Court's marriage and family privacy decisions . 62 Lawrence
instructs that, where same-sex couples are concerned, a state may not "seek
to control a personal relationship," "define the meaning of the relationship,"
or "set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the
law protects. '263 If a mini-DOMA state does anything when it purports to
void or deny recognition to an existing marriage, it certainly seeks to control
that relationship, set its boundaries, and define its meaning. Lawrence
teaches that the reason states may not criminalize sodomy is that "sodomy
is understood to be essential to a personal relationship that has constitutional
value. ' '26 4 Indeed, the "[tihemes of respect and stigma [that] are at the moral
center of the Lawrence opinion ... are entirely new to substantive due
process doctrine. 2 65 "What is truly 'fundamental' .. . Lawrence tells us, is
not the set of specific acts that have been found to merit constitutional
protection, but rather the relationships and self-governing commitments out
of which those acts arise .... ,,266 Lawrence demonstrates family privacy
doctrine's continuing ability to adapt to new questions and problems. It
teaches that "while history is a crucial (perhaps the crucial) guide to the
contours of what rights are implicitly protected by due process, it is not a
guide to who gets to exercise those rights. 267
"[T]he fundament of the right to privacy," Jeb Rubenfeld argues, "is not
to be found in the supposed fundamentality of what the law proscribes. It is
to be found in what the law imposes. '268 Viewed from this standpoint, "[t]he
distinguishing feature of the laws struck down by the privacy cases has been
their profound capacity to direct and to occupy individuals' lives through
their affirmative consequences. ' 269 Just as "the real force of anti-homosexual
laws" like the sodomy statutes struck down in Lawrence was "that they en-
list and redirect physical and emotional desires that we do not expect people
to suppress, '271 the real force of antimarriage recognition laws is that they
enlist and redirect emotional commitments, legal rights, and personal identi-
ties that we do not expect people to merely surrender.
Marriage is among the "undertakings that go on for years, define roles, di-
rect activities, operate on or even create intense emotional relations, enlist the
262. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
263. Id. at 567.
264. Robert C. Post, Foreword, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 102 (2003).
265. Id. at 97.
266. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1955 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
267. Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due Process,
16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 23, 24 (2005).
268. Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739 (1989).
269. Id. at 740.
270. Id. at 800.
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body, inform values, and in sum substantially shape the totality of a per-
son's daily life and consciousness. 27 1 Accordingly, "[l]aws that force such
undertakings on individuals may properly be called 'totalitarian,' and the
right to privacy exists to protect against them."2 72 Laws that deprive indi-
viduals of such undertakings once they have been legally entered into and
begun to shape the individual's emotional relations, body, values, daily life,
and consciousness, are no less totalitarian. Indeed, they may be more so. To
borrow a line from Richard Posner (who was writing about the contraceptive
law invalidated in Griswold), "A constitution that did not invalidate [laws]
so offensive, oppressive, probably undemocratic, and sectarian ... would
stand revealed as containing major gaps. '273
In summary, the Constitution "protect[s] the family because it contrib-
utes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a
preference for stereotypical households. '274 Even conceding that a state has
an important interest in defining the criteria for entry into marriage, under
the intermediate form of scrutiny I have suggested, a law that purports to void
or deny recognition to an existing relationship "sweep[s] unnecessarily broad-
ly" as a means to advance that interest because it "invade[s] the area of
protected freedoms."275 Once a marriage has been created-that is, once a
family has been created-privacy means that the range of legitimate purposes
the state may invoke for regulating within this sphere narrows dramatically.
Nonrecognition laws are constitutionally offensive because they "slic[e]
deeply into the family itself' 27 6 in order to make little more than a symbolic
point about the state's preference for heterosexual marriage. Traditional
state control over the criteria for marriage does not empower the state to
impose its ideas so coercively. As Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, "[A]
state interest in standardizing its children and adults, making the 'private
realm of family life' conform to some state-designed ideal, is not a legiti-
mate state interest at all. 277
3. Respect for Settled Legal and Social Practices
Due Process Clause analysis is informed by settled legal and social prac-
tices, especially when the issue involves a substantial liberty interest. It
thereby "serves a conserving function, furthering stability in the law and
protecting societal expectations concerning individual freedom. 278 The
271. Id. at 801-02.
272. Id. at 802.
273. POSNER, supra note 178, at 328.
274. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
275. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
276. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977) (plurality opinion).
277. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,452 (1990).
278. Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REv. 63,
95 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
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Court has said that "guideposts" for substantive due process analysis should
come from "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. '279 At the
same time, it acknowledged in Lawrence that "[h]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry,"280 and that the inquiry should be informed by "emerging
recognition"2 1  of contemporary social realities and how law interacts with
those realities.
A constitutional right of marriage recognition is consistent with our na-
tion's settled legal and social practices because it simply enacts and enforces
the place of celebration rule. That rule has been called the "universal prac-
tice of civilized nations,'2 82 and every American state subscribes to it in
some form. Joel Prentiss Bishop, commenting more than a century ago on
marriage in both English and American common law, wrote that "one uni-
versal rule whereby to determine whether parties are to be regarded as
married or not" was necessary for "the peace of the world, for the prosperity
of its respective communities, for the well-being of families, for virtue in
social life, for good morals, for religion, for everything held dear by the race
of man in common." '283 And so, a right of marriage recognition satisfies the
"history and tradition" test.
This conclusion is not altered by the fact that there has been, until re-
cently, no social or legal custom of recognizing same-sex marriages.
Arguing against the right on that basis would make the same mistake that
the Court made in Bowers v. Hardwick284 when it framed the question before
it as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy."285 As the Court recognized in Lawrence,
such a crabbed formulation views the right at too low a level of abstraction
and "misapprehend[s] the claim of liberty."28 6 In so doing, it stacks the deck
against the plaintiff's claim. Law traditionally has validated marriages not to
advance particular ideas or rules about sexuality or gender, but because do-
ing so protects the stability of legal relationships, advances reasonable
expectations, prevents the casual evasion of legal responsibilities, and con-
tributes to smooth functioning of the interstate system. These are neutral,
utilitarian policies, and they can fairly be said to be "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."287 Favoritism toward heterosexuality is certainly one
"tradition" in American marriage law, but that tradition concerns who gets to
279. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
280. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lew-
is, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
281. Id.
282. Cropsey v. Ogden, 11 N.Y. 228, 236 (1854).
283. BISHOP, supra note 84, § 856.
284. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
285. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
286. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
287. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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enter marriage. Gender and sexual orientation are irrelevant to the purposes
of the established rule of interstate marriage recognition.
Of course, the place of celebration rule is subject to the public policy
exception. Is it possible to argue that a liberty interest arises out of a
historical tradition if the historical tradition ultimately allowed the state to
prevail when the state felt strongly enough about the matter? I believe so.
Although "history and tradition" and "ordered liberty" tend to be the language
of fundamental rights analysis, I am not arguing for an absolute or
fundamental right of marriage recognition. Under an intermediate form of
scrutiny that requires the state to describe an important interest and explain
why an infringement of liberty is necessary to significantly further that
interest, a constitutional right of marriage recognition simply calls for a
similar application of reasoned judicial judgment as the public policy
exception once did. It calls on judges to examine the nature and weight of
state interests and then determine whether those interests justify, as Judge
Cardozo put it, "refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to
him."288
4. Due Process in Its Most Basic Sense
There appears to be no clear explanation for what happens, as a formal
legal matter, when a state purports to void or deny recognition to a mar-
riage simply by operation of law. Koppelman writes that when a same-sex
couple migrates to a mini-DOMA state, "their marriage would cease (or,
perhaps, become dormant; it is unclear whether it should spring back to
life when they, or one of them, moves back to the state in which they were
married). '289 Or perhaps "the marriage just dissolves. '290 Just dissolves?
Springs back to life? For a relation as important as marriage, this seems,
objectively, like madness. (And Koppelman apparently agrees, labeling the
"uncertainty" such laws create "intolerable." 29 1) A right of marriage recogni-
tion is necessary to preserve the meaning of due process per se.
The fight to marry is already protected as a matter of substantive due
process. In addition, I have explained in the earlier sections of this Part why
an independent liberty interest in an extant marriage is supported by reason-
able expectations, marital and family privacy, and the settled legal and social
practice of marriage recognition. Taking all these considerations together, it
is fair to conclude that when a state voids or denies recognition to an extant
marriage, it has deprived the parties of "liberty" within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause. Further, this deprivation is "without due process of
law"2 92 because the state obviously is not offering same-sex couples any sort
of adjudication before it effectively dissolves their marriages.
288. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
289. KOPPELMAN, supra note 21, at 90.
290. Id. at91.
291. Id. at26.
292. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Of course, I am not arguing that a state might be allowed to enforce its
mini-DOMA against a migratory same-sex couple as long as it holds a hear-
ing. After all, what sort of evidence would it put on? Rather, the point of this
discussion is to underscore what an unusual, even radical, idea it is that a
state could unilaterally and by operation of law take away the legal status
and rights in marriage that another state has seen fit to create.
The notion that proper procedure is necessary to protect substantive
rights is established in the Supreme Court's family privacy jurisprudence,
most notably in the protection it provides against interference with the par-
ent-child relationship. In Santosky v. Kramer,293 the Court first took notice
of "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child," which afforded the parents "a vital interest
in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. ' 29 4 The Court
then held that, before a state may terminate parental rights based on a par-
ent's alleged unfitness, "it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair
procedures, '295 specifically a hearing at which the state must meet the stand-
ard of clear and convincing evidence. 296
Assuming we are not trapped in the thinking of the state interests para-
digm, it is difficult to understand how marriage could require anything less.
Indeed, the Court in a famous old case expressly drew the analogy between
the marital relationship and the parent-child relationship, calling marriage
"a social relation, like that of parent and child, the obligations of which arise
not from the consent of concurring minds, but are the creation of the law
itself ... "297 And as one state high court put it in underscoring that mar-
riage is a legal status and not merely a contract, "When [a marriage is]
formed, this relation is no more a contract than 'fatherhood' or 'sonship' is a
contract.
298
The understanding of marriage set forth in modem authorities also de-
fies the idea that a state could effectively nullify the relationship by
operation of law. According to a leading treatise, the "distinctive characteris-
tic of permanence distinguishes the marriage status from a purely
consensual transaction," and accordingly, a "marriage is subject to dissolu-
tion only through legal proceedings or the death of one of the spouses. 299
And the Supreme Court has said recently that "we know of no instance"
where individuals may "liberate themselves from the constraints of legal
obligations that go with marriage ... without invoking the State's judicial
machinery."3°° Further, in Sosna v. Iowa,3°0 the Supreme Court emphasized
293. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
294. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
295. Id. at 753-54.
296. Id. at 769.
297. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
298. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87, 101 (1856).
299. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 11, at 558 (emphasis added).
300. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
301. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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the role of procedural safeguards in a proceeding that would "affect [a cou-
ple's] marital status and very likely their property rights," along with
custody and support for minor children.30 2 In other contexts as well, the
Court has said that "alteration of legal status," combined with some result-
ing injury, "justifie[s] the invocation of procedural safeguards."3 3
Traditionally, when a marriage had some irregularity in its creation, the
law considered it either "void" or "voidable." "Technically a void marriage
is non-existent and has never existed," while a "voidable marriage ... is
effective until it is formally voided, usually as a result of a court order in an
annulment action."3" Neither of these concepts can adequately explain the
operation or effect of nonrecognition laws.
A migratory marriage cannot properly be categorized as "voidable," be-
cause the mini-DOMA state is not offering an adjudication or any other
"process" before declaring it null. And it is extremely problematic from a
federalism perspective-as well as simply illogical-to characterize a mi-
gratory marriage as "void" ab initio. Obviously, the marriage was not void at
the start-it was perfectly effective in the marital domicile. If we ignore that
fact and indulge a legal fiction that the marriage is void ab initio in the eyes
of the mini-DOMA state to which the parties have resettled, we effectively
allow the mini-DOMA state to give its regulatory laws extraterritorial ef-
fect-something that has long been thought to violate both constitutional
due process and basic notions of federalism.305 As Thomas Cooley wrote in
1868, "The legislative authority of every State must spend its force within
the territorial limits of the State. The legislature of one State cannot make
laws by which people outside the State must govern their actions. '306 If a
state considers a migratory marriage void ab initio, it is necessarily saying
that it had some legitimate interest and power over the marriage at the time
the marriage occurred. But obviously that cannot be true. If Helen and Jenny
live and marry in Iowa, Indiana has no proper authority over their lives and
relationship unless and until they come within Indiana's borders and thereby
consent to be governed by Indiana's laws. 3 7
At that point, we can acknowledge that Indiana may have a different
view on the question of whether their marriage should continue to be given
legal effect. But we should not allow the state to simply impose the answer
302. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406-07.
303. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708--09 (1976).
304. HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW 86 (6th ed. 2007) (emphasis omitted).
305. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 160, at 1526 ("The Due Process Clause was used as the
source of the principle that a state law could not be applied to property or occurrences beyond
the borders of the state.").
306. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 127-28
(1868).
307. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 160, at 1553 ("When a state attempt[s] to regulate mat-
ters beyond its borders, it impose[s] a non-reciprocal burden on the individual being regulated.
The fact that there [is] no reciprocity in the relationship between the individual and the state
indicate[s] a defect of assent to be governed.").
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through a mini-DOMA that declares it "void."308 Rather, as I explain in the
next Section, we should weigh Indiana's state interests against the couple's
liberty interest in the ongoing vitality of their marriage.
C. Assessing Countervailing State Interests
The due process principles discussed above support the argument that a
migratory same-sex couple has a significant liberty interest in the ongoing
existence of their marriage. I now consider the countervailing interests a
state might assert to resist a due process right of marriage recognition.
1. Traditional State Sovereignty over Family Law
Despite the legal and social evolution of marriage I described in Part I,
courts still often say that in the American scheme of federalism, matters of
domestic relations are reserved to the states.3" And so one interest that a
state might assert to justify a nonrecognition law is its traditional sovereign-
ty over the definition of marriage. But in light of the protection that the
Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence has given to marriage and fami-
ly relationships as matters of liberty and privacy, as well as the very
different consequences of creating versus recognizing a marriage, this inter-
est is perhaps the weakest that a state could maintain.
The maxim that domestic relations are reserved to the states has always
been something of an oversimplification. A closer historical examination
shows that the paradigm of exclusive state sovereignty "is not an organic,
transhistorical principle of American federalism. Rather, it developed as a
theory of convenience, strategically invoked and easily dismissed or ig-
nored."31 And even if that were not the case, the Supreme Court's
"willingness during the past century to strike down aspects of state laws
concerning marriage, divorce, legitimacy, parental rights, and reproductive
conduct on a variety of constitutional grounds also contradicts the assertion
that family law questions belong to the states" exclusively.31" '
Because a state has the exclusive power to create marriages, it does not
logically follow that its sovereign interests also extend to nullifying valid
marriages without cause or due process, or that its decision to do so should
receive the same degree of deference. In Williams v. North Carolina, Justice
Douglas famously declared that "[e]ach state as a sovereign has a rightful
308. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 2008) (declaring same-sex marriages "void
... even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized").
309. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (referring to "family
law" as an "area[] of traditional state regulation").
310. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family
Law and the Invention of States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1768 (2005); see also Jill
Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1298
(1998) ("[E]xclusive localism in family law simply misdescribes American history...").
311. Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 274 (2009).
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and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its
borders."'31 2 Some conflicts scholars have pointed to this language as support
for the idea that when a mini-DOMA state assumes the authority to void or
deny recognition to a same-sex marriage, it is simply exercising its ordi-
nary state power over domestic relations." 3 But that inference is unsound
because it takes the key language out of context. This passage of Williams
is not about the primacy of the state over the individual-such an idea
would be curious indeed, coming from the pen of William 0. Douglas,
perhaps the most determined free spirit and proponent of individual auton-
omy who ever sat on the Court. Williams upheld an individual's ability to
control his own marital status by obtaining a divorce.3"4 The passage in
Williams about states' interest in marital status was rendered in the course
of reasoning toward a decision that expanded individual liberty-an individu-
al's freedom to control his own life-and rejected arguments that the
individual's interests should be subjugated to the state's morality-based
ideas about marriage.315 And recall that Williams overturned Haddock v.
Haddock,1 6 which involved a man who had been validly divorced in one
state but was still legally married in another-the same situation that
same-sex couples face today.317 "Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not
merely to the immediate parties. It affects personal rights of the deepest sig-
nificance," the Court explained in a follow-on decision to Williams."8
"Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status, every consideration of
policy makes it desirable that the effect should be the same wherever the
question arises.'319
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, Williams rested on the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, not the Due Process Clause.320 But doctrinal differences
aside, the Court was wrestling with much the same problem that marriage
nonrecognition laws pose today: the problem that excessive domestic rela-
tions localism can impose on individuals and the needs of the interstate
system. As Ann Estin writes,
The divorce cases illustrate the key problem with federalism in family law:
in a world in which people move frequently from place to place, there is no
dependable means of allocating responsibility for families and family dis-
putes among different states. Despite considerable creativity brought to the
divorce problem over more than a century by judges, lawyers, treatise
writers, and other academic experts, it had become increasingly apparent
by 1942 that the old federalism, which gave states broad control over the
312. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942).
313. E.g., Koppelman, supra note 70, at 940.
314. See Williams, 317 U.S. at 303.
315. Id.
316. Williams, 317 U.S. at 304.
317. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562,564-65 (1906).
318. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
319. Id.
320. See Williams, 317 U.S. at 293-94.
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norms of family law, did not work. The conflict among the states over
divorce was understood as a political problem, but political solutions
were not forthcoming, and the Supreme Court was eventually unwilling to
allow the policies of a few states to block a more workable national com-
promise.
32
In providing that compromise,
the Supreme Court acted on the view that the Constitution demanded a
more coherent and unified national approach to the divorce problem than
what Congress or the states had been able to achieve. The Court recog-
nized that its rulings would limit the conservative states in enforcement of
their divorce laws but concluded that important personal rights were at
stake, and that, on balance, the individual interest in marital freedom and
the national interest in uniform rules were more important than state di-
vorce policies.1
2
In terms of its imposition on sovereignty, asking a state to recognize an
extant marriage is a much different matter than requiring it to create a mar-
riage to which it objects. As support for this principle, we need look no further
than the place of celebration rule, under which states have long agreed to give
effect to marriages they would not have created in the first instance.3 23 In do-
ing so, states set aside some quantum of their own interests and sovereignty
out of recognition that everyone-individuals, sister states, the interstate sys-
tem-is better off when intact marriages are not disrupted.
In short, if creating a marriage is a core incident of state sovereignty be-
cause of "the distinctive role that states play in the formulation and
enforcement of community norms and values,"3 24 requiring one state to recog-
nize another state's marriage is simply the price of living in a federal system
of equal sovereigns, which "demands that the moral commitments of each
state be tempered by a regard for the commitments of its neighbors."
325
2. Expressive and Channeling Interests
Law has important expressive functions, and despite the loosening of re-
strictions on marriage entry and the relatively laissez-faire posture of
contemporary marriage law and regulation, it is still plausible to say that a
state's marriage policy expresses the values of its governing majority
about what kinds of human relationships should be entitled to dignity and
protection. Marriage law channels people into a legal relationship with well-
established social meaning. When a state excludes gays and lesbians from the
possibility of marriage, it expresses its preference for heterosexuality and
321. Estin, supra note 43, at 431 (footnote omitted).
322. Id.
323. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
324. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1795 (1995).
325. Seth F Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to
Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.YU. L. REV. 451, 519
(1992).
June 20121
Michigan Law Review
enacts the view that heterosexuals are more deserving of marriage's bene-
fits and more capable of fulfilling marriage's social role. This perhaps
explains why "[t]he most contentious argument regarding recognizing same-
sex marriages is that recognition places a seal of approval on homosexual
relationships. 3 26
Abundant arguments have been advanced in recent state and federal
litigation over whether, under the Constitution, such expressive and chan-
neling interests-which are sometimes shorthanded merely as appeals to
"tradition" 327-- can justify withholding marriage creation from same-sex
couples. But a marriage recognition right is agnostic on that question. A
state would remain free to express its preference for heterosexuality by li-
censing only heterosexual marriages. The proper question is, where a valid
same-sex marriage already exists as a fait accompli, are the state's expres-
sive and channeling interests important enough and necessary to justify
nullifying that marriage? The answer should be no.
As a practical matter, a state's signaling about the benefits of heterosex-
ual marriage, whether or not it is effective on single people, is beside the
point for gay or lesbian individuals who have already gotten married. Quite
simply, the state has missed its opportunity to channel them into a different
sort of marriage. Moreover, there is no reason to think that denying legal
recognition to existing same-sex marriages will somehow increase the num-
ber of people choosing to enter opposite-sex marriages. "Even if one accepts
... that the state has a reasonable role to play in shaping norms through its
domestic laws ... [a] state that objects to same-sex marriages might signal
its views with sufficient clarity through its rules for in-state marriages. 328
When a state expresses its favoritism toward heterosexual marriage by
denying licenses to same-sex couples, gays and lesbians are excluded from
the dignity and benefits of that status-the "positive" component of the right
to marry that I discussed in Section III.A329 -but no one's life is actually
made worse than it was before. By contrast, as I explained in Section III.B,
voiding or denying recognition to an existing marriage is an extraordinary
harm and intrusion, and the magnitude of that harm cannot be justified by
mere expressive or signaling interests. If a state believes that same-sex mar-
riages are somehow harmful or unhealthy, it should be required to provide
persuasive, objective evidence before interfering with an established legal
relationship. In Romer v. Evans,33 ° the Court said that a state cannot subject
gays and lesbians to "special disabilit[ies]" that are "so discontinuous with
326. Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 98, at 591.
327. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Mar-
riage, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 341 (2011) (arguing that courts should "be skeptical of a law
justified by tradition, and should not uphold it absent a convincing showing of alternative,
legitimate purposes").
328. Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 98, at 591.
329. See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text.
330. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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the reasons offered" that they are "inexplicable by anything but animus. 331
And Lawrence requires states to respect the privacy and autonomy in gay
and lesbian relationships. As Tobias Wolff explains, the combined force of
these two decisions means that "states may not exclude gay relationships
from their territory, may not attempt to dissuade those couples from migrat-
ing to the state, and may not subject them to disfavored treatment solely on
the basis of moral disapproval. '33' Thus, "the range of interests that a state
can offer in applying forum law to a bona fide out-of-state marriage is sig-
nificantly constrained. 333
3. State Control Over Marital Incidents
I argued in Section III.A that a right of marriage recognition is a form of
negative liberty, something appropriately protected by the Due Process
Clause, because it prevents a mini-DOMA state from coercively interfering
with an extant legal family relationship. However, it might be pointed out
that if a marriage is recognized, the couple becomes entitled to claim a vari-
ety of state-provided benefits and protections-what are typically referred to
as incidents of marriage. And so, a mini-DOMA state could argue that a
constitutional right of recognition not only would impose symbolic costs on
its sovereignty, but it would also impose real costs by forcing the state to
confer benefits and protections on marriages that the state has decided do
not deserve such incidents. But marital incidents today are, by and large, not
an endorsement of any one form or idea of marriage. Accordingly, a state
does not have a sufficiently important interest in withholding them from
migratory same-sex couples. Moreover, any interest the state does have
could not justify the harm that is caused by revoking incidents that marital
parties have already enjoyed in another state.
To be clear, the constitutional marriage recognition rule I propose would
protect the status of marriage. It would not create an entitlement to any spe-
cific rights or incidents. It would simply require that the couple be
recognized as entitled on equal terms to whatever incidents and legal protec-
tions are given to all other marriages in a particular state.
Under traditional conflicts doctrine, while the place of celebration rule
governed the validity of the marriage, courts were allowed to look to local
law to determine whether a married party should be entitled under local law
to enjoy a particular marital incident.3 34 Until fairly recently, the most im-
portant marital incident was the right to legally cohabitate. This incident is
essentially obsolete today, but it carried real significance when sex outside
of marriage could involve criminal penalties. Letting local law control made
331. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
332. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2244 (2005).
333. Id.
334. C.W. Taintor, II, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of Mar-
riage, 19 B.U. L. REV. 353, 357 (1939).
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sense where an incident was intertwined with the forum's criminal law.
States generally denied the incident of cohabitation in two situations: where
the marriage was "miscegenous," or where it was "within prohibited degrees
of consanguinity."335 However, even where cohabitation was prohibited,
states were sometimes willing to recognize a marriage for purposes of prop-
erty interests, such as a spouse's right to inherit upon the other's death.
"Even if cohabitation of two persons . .. would be abhorrent," one authority
put it, "the existence of a right to property in one of those two persons after
the death of the other ... seems unobjectionable." '336
Today, the incidents of marriage fall broadly into three categories. The
first is "laws [that] recognize affective or emotional bonds. 3 37 These include
laws which allow one spouse to make medical decisions for the other and
which designate a spouse as an automatic heir. 38 The second category of
incidents relates to "marriage as ... an environment ... for the raising of
children. 3 39 This includes "the presumptions of legitimacy and parentage
of children born to a married couple."34° The third category relates to "the
economic arrangements that are likely to exist (or that ought to exist) be-
tween partners. '341 These include "[tax laws and laws pertaining to
government benefits [that] commonly treat married persons in a distinctive
manner by regarding them for most purposes as a single economic unit,"'342
as well as rules about marital assets and property, including property divi-
sion at divorce. 343
All these incidents favor marriage, but they do not inherently favor or
promote heterosexual marriage. Thus, a state's heteronormative marriage
policy, if it chooses to maintain one, is not significantly undermined by
providing these incidents to validly married same-sex couples. Many of
the incidents are "facilitative, in the sense that they enable a couple to live
a life that they define as satisfactory to themselves."3" Others are simply
practical, recognizing that "married persons differ from most single per-
sons" in that many married couples pool their financial resources and that
living together provides economies of scale.345 Others, like the spousal
evidentiary privilege, protect the privacy of the marital relationship. Taken
as a whole, state-provided marital incidents are calibrated toward assuring
that a marriage endures and can fulfill its social role; toward, as one state
335. Id.
336. Id. at 362.
337. David L. Chambers, What If.? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 453 (1996).
338. Id. at 454-56.
339. Id. at 453.
340. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,956 (Mass. 2003).
341. Chambers, supra note 337, at 453.
342. Id. at 472.
343. Id. at 476-78.
344. Id. at 485.
345. Id. at 471.
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high court has put it, "promoting a commitment between married couples to
promote the security of their children and the community as a whole. 3 46
When state supreme courts have struck down anti-same-sex marriage
laws, they have rejected the arguments that same-sex couples have less need
for state-conferred benefits and protections than opposite-sex couples and
that limiting incidents to heterosexuals advances a legitimate state interest in
conserving scarce resources. 347 "The legal benefits and protections flowing
from a marriage license are of such significance," said the Vermont Supreme
Court, "that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public
concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of the
deprivation cannot seriously be questioned."348
Whether or not that standard is met by the justifications states have ad-
vanced for refusing to create same-sex marriages is a question on which
courts have differed, and it is not my concern here. But because marital in-
cidents do not inherently favor or promote any particular type of marriage, a
state's interest in withholding them from same-sex couples is not necessary
or important enough to justify the hardship and disruption inflicted when
migratory couples are cut off from incidents that they have previously re-
ceived. Merely making a statement that such couples are morally unworthy
of standard marital incidents cannot be an important state interest in itself.
And in light of the fact that we do not have marriage visas in this country-
marital incidents are made freely and automatically available to virtually all
other migratory couples-a policy of withholding incidents from established
same-sex couples is not necessary to protecting a state's policy on what
marriages to create. Thus, such a "broad and undifferentiated disability"
would be "so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it" that it would be
"inexplicable by anything but animus."349
4. Encouraging Heterosexual Procreation
Several state courts that have rejected same-sex couples' right to marry
have done so by crediting the argument that a state has a legitimate interest
in preferring heterosexual marriage for reasons of procreation. As the
346. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999).
347. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003); see
also Chambers, supra note 337, at 447. It is also worth noting that, to the extent that provision
of some marital incidents requires expenditures from the state treasury, studies have shown
that those additional costs can be mitigated, if not completely or more than offset, by a num-
ber of fiscal benefits that states experience when they recognize same-sex marriages. See, e.g.,
ANGELIKI KASTANIS, MX LEE BADGETT, & JODY L. HERMAN, THE WILLIAMS INST., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXTENDING MARRIAGE TO SAME-SEX COUPLES IN WASHINGTON STATE
(Jan. 2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/economic-impact-
reports/estimating-the-economic-boost-of-marriage-equality-in-washingtn-state-sales-tax-2
(estimating that "spending on wedding arrangements and tourism by resident same-sex cou-
ples and their guests" would add $88 million to the state and local economies of Washington
over the first three years, including $8 million in tax revenues),
348. Baker, 744 A.2d at 884.
349. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632 (1996).
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Washington Supreme Court said in Andersen v. King County, "[M]arriage is
traditionally linked to procreation and survival of the human race.
Heterosexual couples are the only couples who can produce biological
offspring of the couple 350 Thus, the court said, lawmakers were entitled to
believe that limiting marriage to heterosexuals "will encourage
procreation. '351 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals characterized
"marriage and its attendant benefits" as "an inducement" for heterosexuals
to "make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other," something that
was justified by the facts that "such relationships are all too often casual or
temporary" and that "an important function of marriage is to create more
stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be
born." 352
Not all courts have accepted this argument. The Iowa Supreme Court in
Varnum v. Brien rejected the idea that procreation is "the sine qua non of
marriage. Instead, it found that marriage is intended to promote the com-
fort and happiness of committed couples and to bring order and stability to
their relational rights and responsibilities as well as their families. 3 53 And
more generally, "[t]he elimination of legal distinctions between marital
and nonmarital children, the availability of contraceptives, and access to
abortion all illustrate both the separation of procreation from marriage and
the limited nature of the state's interest in those decisions. 354 If such a link
ever existed, it was decisively severed by the Court's holdings in Griswold355
(upholding married persons' right of access to contraceptives), Roe356 (find-
ing a right to abortion), and Turner357 (striking down a law prohibiting
prison inmates from marrying while acknowledging that some such mar-
riages might never be "fully consummated").
Even if we accept promotion of heterosexual procreation as an important
reason for a state to refuse to create same-sex marriages, refusing to recognize
extant migratory same-sex marriages is not necessary to effectuate that policy.
For a same-sex couple whose marriage already exists, no amount of
'encouragement" or "inducement" toward the benefits of heterosexual
marriage will change the existential fact of their marriage. Allowing a same-
sex couple who married in State A to continue living as a married couple in
State B would not diminish the power or effectiveness of State B's marriage-
for-procreation policy, any more than the policy is diminished by the
empirical fact that many unmarried heterosexuals will continue to cohabitate
350. 138 P.3d 963, 982-83 (Wash. 2006).
351. Anderson, 138 P.3d at 983.
352. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
353. Jean C. Love, The Synergistic Evolution of Liberty and Equality in the Marriage
Cases Brought by Same-Sex Couples in State Courts, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 275, 318
(2010) (discussing Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d (Iowa 2009)).
354. Hamilton, supra note 62, at 350 (footnotes omitted).
355. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
356. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
357. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
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and produce children. As with expressive and signaling interests, it may be
fine for a state to incentivize heterosexual procreation by celebrating the
virtues of heterosexual marriage. But states have long been out of the
business of punishing non-marital procreation through harsh regimes that
disadvantaged "illegitimate" offspring or threatened to remove children
from unwed single parents. Just as it would be unthinkable today for a state
to enforce its preference for marital families by punishing out-of-wedlock
heterosexual procreation, so a state may not punish same-sex couples
through the extraordinary harm of voiding or denying recognition to their
marriages.
5. Fairness to Long-Term Residents
Finally, a state could argue that it would be unfair for migratory same-sex
couples to enjoy the status and incidents of marriage when those things are
denied to its own existing gay and lesbian domiciliaries. Passing over the fact
that a state could remedy this problem by allowing its own same-sex domicili-
ary couples to marry, there is no real unfairness here, and such objections are
not an important reason for voiding or denying recognition to marriages when
they migrate from other states.
First, as I explained in Section IlI.A, recognizing an existing marriage is
conceptually and legally distinguishable from creating a marriage. Nullify-
ing a migratory marriage is not necessary to effectuate the values embedded
in a state's marriage-creation policy. This is the principle behind the place of
celebration rule, under which states have long recognized marriages that
they themselves would not have created. The unfairness here is no greater
than was the unfairness to couples who sought common-law marriages, mar-
riages within prohibited degrees of consanguinity, or other unions that their
domiciliary states disallowed even while recognizing such unions created in
other jurisdictions.3 58 Indeed, pursuant to the place of celebration rule, at
least one state (Maryland) will recognize same-sex marriages even though it
will not create them.359 New York took the same posture before it began li-
censing such marriages in 2011.360
Second, if we accept the argument that marriage recognition is a signifi-
cant liberty interest under the Due Process Clause for all married persons,
then a state that gives recognition to heterosexual marriages but denies it to
same-sex marriages ends up with an equal protection problem. Such a state
would have living within its borders two groups of similarly situated citizens
whom the law classifies differently: heterosexuals with valid marriages
(many having migrated from other states), whom the state favors, and ho-
mosexuals with valid marriages, whom the state disfavors.
358. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
359. See Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, supra note 117.
360. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
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To sum up, a right of marriage recognition would account for significant
due process interests-reasonable expectations, marital and family privacy,
settled social and legal practices, and the requirement of proper procedure
before liberty is infringed-which a state invades when it voids or denies
recognition to a migratory marriage. Under the intermediate level of scruti-
ny that is appropriate for a right of marriage recognition, a state's interests
in depriving same-sex couples of their marriages fail because they are not
important enough to justify marriage nullification or because the radical step
of marriage nullification is not necessary to significantly advance those in-
terests.
V. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION AND FEDERALISM
Most of the arguments I have advanced for a Due Process Clause right
of marriage recognition have focused on the interests of married individuals
as weighed against the interests of a state in applying its marriage policy
coercively to disrupt an extant marriage. I have explained why the state's
interests do not justify voiding or denying recognition to a migratory same-
sex marriage. I conclude with some observations about the effect a marriage
recognition right would have on federalism.
A right of marriage recognition would strike a balance that is acceptable,
even necessary, for purposes of federalism. It would allow each state to de-
cide whether to provide same-sex marriage for its own domiciliaries. But it
would also underscore that in a highly mobile society like the United States,
recognizing a sister state's valid marriage is one of the prices of membership
in a federal system of equal state sovereigns. After all, "[o]ne of the virtues
of a territorial federalism is precisely that it allows conflicting communi-
ties of commitment to coexist within a single national polity, while
allowing individuals to move fluidly among them. '36' Such a nuanced con-
ception of federalism--one that attempts to "assess[] ... the specific
weight of state interests" and to "balance state and national interests in a
theoretically coherent fashion" 36 -- is necessary if states are to "advance
their common welfare, without undue sacrifice of their diversities and the
creative energies to which diversity gives rise.- 363
Federalism "presupposes that each state will be permitted to effectuate,
to the extent consistent with the identical right of every other state, the poli-
cies it adopts.'' 364 But "[t]hose policies are as susceptible to frustration by
sister states as by the central government."3 65 The current regime of nonrec-
ognition laws in a lopsided majority of states has given us what former
361. Seth F. Kreimer, Territoriality and Moral Dissensus: Thoughts on Abortion, Slav-
ery, Gay Marriage and Family Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 161, 163 (1996).
362. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 364-65 (1997).
363. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 543
(1954).
364. Baxter, supra note 143, at 24.
365. Id.
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Georgia congressman Bob Barr, an advocate-turned-opponent of the fed-
eral DOMA, has aptly called "one-way federalism," because "[i]t protects
only those states that don't want to accept a same-sex marriage granted by
another state. ' 366 Mini-DOMA states get to bar same-sex marriage for their
own domiciliaries, and they get to void or deny recognition to migratory
marriages created by sister states. As a result, "the novel experiment that
is being undertaken on the state level" in the United States right now "is
not simply about what quantum of rights to extend to same-sex couples. It
is principally about what quantum of disabilities to impose on same-sex
relationships. 367
Competitive federalism does not work if the playing field is not level.
Interstate transportability is a basic incident and defining characteristic of
American marriage. When a mini-DOMA state treats a sister state's mar-
riage license like a piece of worthless foreign currency, it not only violates
the rights of the married individuals, it also deems the policy of the other
state to be repugnant. As Andrew Koppelman argues, such laws "have no
place in a federal system 368 "[N]o law, not even one favored by a great ma-
jority of the States, [should be allowed to] reduce any State's official acts,
on any subject, to second-class status ... 369 Federalism cannot tolerate a
"state's prideful unwillingness to recognize other states' laws or judgments
on the ground that these are inferior or unacceptable. '37° Consistent with
long-established conflicts principles, a state can adequately protect its inter-
est by refusing to recognize evasive marriages procured by its own
domiciliaries-the right of marriage recognition I propose would not alter
that rule. But if Indiana gets to decide what marriages it wants to license, a
workable federalism also means that Indiana cannot undermine Iowa's pub-
lic policy by voiding or refusing to recognize the marriages that Iowa
created for its own domiciliaries.
State differences over same-sex marriages reflect what Naomi Cahn and
June Carbone call a "blue family paradigm" and a "red family paradigm. '371
The blue family paradigm emphasizes values of autonomy, equality, and
sexual freedom, and consequently is supportive of same-sex marriage. 372 By
contrast, the red family paradigm, driven by religious teaching, "counsels
366. Bob Barr, Opinion, No Defending the Defense of Marriage Act, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.comlnews/opinion/commentarylla-oe-barr5-2009
jan05,0,1855836.story.
367. Knauer, supra note 190, at 430.
368. Koppelman, supra note 70, at 964.
369. Melissa Rothstein, The Defense of Marriage Act and Federalism: A States' Rights
Argument in Defense of Same-Sex Marriages, 31 FAM. L.Q. 571, 582 (1997) (quoting 142
CONG. REC. S5931, S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (letter from Lawrence Tribe to Senator
Kennedy)).
370. Kramer, supra note 123, at 1986.
371. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES (2010).
372. See id. at 1-2.
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more prescriptive (and traditional) roles for men and women" and "cele-
brate[s] the unity of sex, marriage, and procreation. 373
Cahn and Carbone advocate state-by-state experimentation with marriage
in the great tradition of federalism. 374 They see nothing wrong with states
promoting the importance of marriage generally, or even the superiority of
heterosexual marriage specifically. But they also argue that states' ability to
prefer particular family values must be balanced by "respect for autonomy
and restraint in the use of the coercive power of the state. 3 75 Such a balance
acknowledges that "[w]hile the state can articulate the shared values it wish-
es to promote, it is a very different matter-constitutionally and
normatively-to impose such values on residents who may not share
them. ' 376 A right of marriage recognition honors this balance, because its
central premise is that "[t]he state interest in promoting stability and com-
mitment is ... distinct from its ability to intrude into realms of private
expression and meaning. 377
A workable federalism requires some principled description of the
proper scope, limits, and interrelationship of each state's sovereign
authority. It is well established in constitutional doctrine that "all states exist
on an 'equal footing' and are 'equal in power, dignity, and authority.' "378
Yet the Constitution "offers no guidance about what to do when [states] do
not respect each other" or how to "regulate[] the friction between these
mini-spheres when they inevitably collide,"3 79 and "no clear constitutional
restraint on exclusions that indirectly frustrate regulatory objectives in
other states."380 Allan Erbsen has suggested that "[a] constitutional common
law of comity, if applied with a light touch," could help moderate such
friction. 381 As we saw in Part II, states legislating mini-DOMAs have
destroyed the comity that conflict of laws doctrine is intended to protect. As
a result, when it comes to same-sex marriage, we currently have neither a
workable federalism nor a fair and rational approach to dealing with the
human relationships that are at risk from nonrecognition laws. The
constitutional compromise that is inherent in a right of marriage recognition
is the best solution from the standpoint of federalism as well as individual
rights.
373. Id. at 2, 168.
374. Id. at 208 ("Let Massachusetts permit same-sex unions, Louisiana experiment with
covenant marriage, Utah provide for high school courses in marriage preparation, and 1,000
counties prescribe premarital education.").
375. Id. at 163.
376. Id.
377. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 371, at 164.
378. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REv. 493, 507 (2008).
379. Id. at 509-10.
380. Id. at 520.
381. Id. at569.
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CONCLUSION
Courts, lawmakers, and citizens are all engaged in a vigorous national
debate over whether the constitutional right to marry must include gays and
lesbians. Virtually forgotten in that debate are tens of thousands of couples
who already have obtained such marriages, but who face the prospect of
losing them if they cross the wrong state border to accept a new job, pursue
a degree, or attend to family responsibilities. Conflicts doctrine is of no use
in dealing with this problem because it has been overtaken by legal and so-
cial realities and has been rendered impotent by the simple fact that most
states are ignoring the rule that conflicts doctrine prescribes in this situation.
To deal with existing same-sex marriages rationally and fairly, it is ap-
propriate to turn to the Constitution. The right of marriage recognition I
have described would not force any state to create a same-sex marriage, but
it would prevent them from inflicting unjustified harms on migratory cou-
ples. It would solve a pressing problem of interstate relations and human
dignity through a constitutional intervention that is narrow, carefully crafted,
and validated by historical experience.
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